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To begin, consider the situation of a black man in Missis-
sippi in 1964 who wanted to vote in a federal election. He would 
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be within his “legal” rights to do so. Since 1870, the United 
States Constitution, the highest law of the land, had provided 
that “[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not 
be denied or abridged . . . by any State on account of race.”1 
Two federal statutes protected this right.2 But the reality is 
that the state and private individuals would vigorously attempt 
to stop him from voting, even to the point of subjecting him and 
his family to violence. People that attempted to help him vote 
could be beaten and even murdered.3  
The point of this simple but sad hypothetical is that civil 
rights laws do not magically create change. Even the most far-
reaching and thoughtfully drafted statutes need to be enforced 
to have any real impact. In the above example, it was not until 
the passage and enforcement of the Voting Rights Act of 19654 
that overt forms of racial exclusion in voting became, for the 
most part, confined to the history books.  
Our collective antidiscrimination experiences have taught 
us that there can be a significant gap between law and reality. 
The spectrum and depth of federal civil rights statutes, includ-
ing the Voting Rights Act of 1965,5 Titles II and VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964,6 the Fair Housing Act,7 and, most recently, 
the Americans with Disabilities Act,8 are impressive and a 
source of national pride. But these statutes have not created a 
more inclusive society on their own. Behind every individual 
gain stands the efforts of social forces dedicated to their en-
forcement.  
The process of enforcement therefore needs to be studied 
and analyzed as part of the larger debate over the form and di-
 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. 
 2. See Civil Rights Act of 1957, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975 (1964); see also 
Civil Rights Act of 1960, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971(c)–(e), 1974e, 1975 (1964).  
 3. State-sanctioned practices to deny African Americans the right to vote 
included poll taxes, literacy requirements, and, in Mississippi, a discriminato-
rily applied constitutional requirement that voters be able to read any section 
of the Mississippi Constitution and give a reasonable interpretation thereof. 
See ROY BROOKS ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION 559 (2005); see also 
DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 482–86 (2004). The vi-
olence of this era is well chronicled. Id. at 491.  
 4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973–1973p (1970).  
 5. Id. 
 6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a–3a (2000) (nondiscrimination in places of public ac-
commodation); id. § 2000e–2000e-17 (nondiscrimination in employment). 
 7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604–3606, 3617 (1988). 
 8. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 
Stat. 327 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).  
 436 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [92:434 
 
rection of civil rights laws. Of late, this discussion has increa-
singly turned toward the judicially and legislatively imposed 
limitations on private enforcement.9 To be sure, there is an im-
portant story to be told about how the ability of private lawyers 
to bring civil rights cases in the public interest (functioning as 
a “private attorney general”) has been systematically under-
mined. But what is being increasingly left out of the public and 
academic discussion is the role of the federal government as an 
enforcer of civil rights laws (what I will call “public enforce-
ment”). Despite being almost entirely a function of presidential 
prerogative, public enforcement of civil rights laws is not often 
discussed in presidential races. And existing academic accounts 
tend to treat public enforcement as chronically ineffective and 
incapable of improvement.10 In the current political environ-
ment, it may seem naïve or overly ambitious to talk about a 
more systemic and effective role for public enforcement author-
ities. But administrations do not last forever, and when the 
pendulum swings back in a more pro–civil rights direction, it is 
important to have models of more proactive public enforcement 
behavior. Moreover, as will be discussed herein, history sug-
gests that a casual dismissal of the effectiveness of public en-
forcement is not entirely warranted.  
My goal is to enlarge the civil rights dialogue by renewing 
emphasis on the importance and form of public enforcement. 
The current decline of the private attorney general’s ability to 
fairly and consistently enforce our civil rights laws strengthens 
the argument for a renewed emphasis on the various enforce-
ment apparatuses of the federal government. When the United 
States takes a strong stand to protect the civil rights of its citi-
zens, it sends a symbolic message and expresses the will of the 
people in a way that cannot and should not be completely out-
sourced.  
Focusing on the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),11 
this Article first makes the case that a stronger government 
role is needed, then explores what that role can and should look 
like. Within the context of the ADA, I will argue that the execu-
tive branch’s role should vary depending on the context. In the 
areas of failure-to-hire claims and those involving physical ac-
cessibility, public enforcement officials should focus on bringing 
 
 9. See infra Part I.A.2.  
 10. See infra Part I.B.1. 
 11. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 
Stat. 327 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 2007] PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT 437 
 
large systemic cases that advocate specific and concrete 
changes. Regarding reasonable accommodations in the 
workplace and a public entity’s responsibilities not to discrimi-
nate in public programs and services, I will suggest that the 
executive branch can more effectively foster flexible solutions in 
a context-specific manner. 
Federal disability laws have suffered from a lack of struc-
tural litigation, or a sustained pattern of cases against large 
power structures invoking the power of the courts to oversee 
detailed injunctive relief. Drawing examples from public en-
forcement of predecessor civil rights statutes, I will argue that 
these types of cases are an important, yet missing, feature of a 
successful antidiscrimination strategy. There are many theoret-
ical and practical reasons why public enforcement authorities 
are uniquely suited to bring these cases and set the agenda for 
disability civil rights enforcement in a way that private attor-
ney generals cannot currently do. Specifically, I identify two 
types of structural cases—claims involving failure to hire and 
physical accessibility—that public enforcement officials can and 
should be bringing on a systematic basis.  
But, in a world where any enforcement official—public or 
private—cannot possibly bring every case, supplementary en-
forcement tools also need to be considered. Recent “new gover-
nance” scholarship in fields such as labor and environmental 
law posits that regulators should diversify the ways they inte-
ract with regulated entities.12 This work focuses on collabora-
tive, multiparty, multilevel, adaptive, problem-solving methods 
of public policy implementation that to varying extents sup-
plant or supplement traditional regulation. Importing this 
theoretical concept into ADA enforcement yields some impor-
tant insights. Specifically, I will suggest that to better realize 
the ADA’s goals regarding reasonable accommodations in the 
workplace and public entities’ responsibilities not to discrimi-
nate on the basis of disability, public enforcement officials 
should consider nontraditional enforcement options. Ultimate-
ly, the goal should be to engage stakeholders in defining these 
concepts in a context-specific and mutually acceptable way, ra-
ther than requiring courts to interpret and express statutory 
rights. 
 
 12. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, “New Governance” in Legal Thought 
and in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 
MINN. L. REV. 471, 471–78 (2004) (providing an explanation of “New Gover-
nance” from a leading environmental law expert). 
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This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I starts by situat-
ing discussions of enforcement within the larger universe of 
scholarship critiquing the effectiveness of civil rights law.13 
Part I then turns to a discussion of the rise and fall of the role 
of the private attorney general in the civil rights arena, a tra-
jectory that opens the door for a renewed discussion of the role 
and effectiveness of public enforcement. Part II explains the 
need for, and importance of, structural public law litigation in 
the disabilities context, and argues that public enforcement of-
ficials are theoretically and practically equipped to take the 
lead. Failure-to-hire and physical access cases provide concrete 
examples where systemic litigation by public officials is needed. 
Part III moves beyond litigation, offering a novel application of 
new governance theory to ADA enforcement, and concludes 
with suggestions on how to maximize the benefits of these al-
ternative types of enforcement activities.  
I.  THE ROLE OF ENFORCEMENT   
There is a strong consensus in the literature (at least 
among progressive commentators) that many federal civil 
rights statutes—including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, the Fair Housing Act, and the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act—have not created as much social change as was origi-
nally hoped.14 Traditionally, academics have focused on either 
 
 13. Although the universe of civil rights laws is technically broader than 
antidiscrimination law, there is a large overlap. Because the primary focus of 
this Article is on the ADA, which fits both descriptions, I will use the terms 
somewhat interchangeably.  
 14. Regarding Title VII, see, for example, Kathryn Abrams, Cross-
Dressing in the Master’s Clothes, 109 YALE L.J. 745, 758 (2000) (suggesting 
that employment discrimination law cannot “actually alter the dominant 
norms of most workplaces or the kinds of roles that men and women play with-
in them”); Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Anti-
discrimination Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1, 20–26 (2006) [hereinafter Bagenstos, 
Structural Turn] (arguing that Title VII has proven ill-suited to redistributing 
power and remedying unintentional discrimination); Christine A. Littleton, 
Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279, 1325–26 (1987) (assert-
ing that Title VII “does not allow for challenges to male bias in the structure of 
business, occupations, or jobs”); and Michael Selmi, The Price of Discrimina-
tion: The Nature of Class Action Employment Discrimination Litigation and 
Its Effects, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1249, 1331–32 (2003) (arguing that class action 
employment litigation has proven ineffective in creating meaningful change). 
Regarding the Fair Housing Act, see, for example, Robert G. Schwemm, Pri-
vate Enforcement and the Fair Housing Act, 6 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 375, 383 
(1988) (“Ultimately, in light of the limited changes in the nation’s housing pat-
terns over the past 20 years, one has to ask whether the Fair Housing Act can 
ever generate a systematic and effective attack on housing discrimination in 
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critiquing court decisions of existing laws or suggesting how 
new legislation should be created or current laws modified. For 
example, within disability law, commentators have consistently 
criticized the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the ADA’s defi-
nition of disability.15 There has also been discussion of amend-
ing the ADA or other disability law statutes to more effectively 
create change in the lives of people with disabilities.16 Criticiz-
 
this country. Experience suggests that the answer is ‘No.’”). See also John O. 
Calmore, Race/ism Lost and Found: The Fair Housing Act at Thirty, 52 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 1067, 1071 (1998) (“Among the modern civil rights laws, fair 
housing law persists as the least effective.”); David A. Thomas, Fixing up Fair 
Housing Laws: Are We Ready for Reform?, 53 S.C. L. REV. 7, 9 (2001) (charac-
terizing the Fair Housing Act as “ineffective”). Regarding the ADA, see, for ex-
ample, Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 
3–4 (2004) (noting the “inability of antidiscrimination laws to eliminate the 
deep structural barriers to employment that people with disabilities face”); see 
also Ruth Colker, Winning and Losing Under the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 239, 240 (2001) (showing defendants’ high success rates 
in ADA employment cases); and Bonnie Potras Tucker, The ADA’s Revolving 
Door: Inherent Flaws in the Civil Rights Paradigm, 62 OHIO ST. L. J. 335, 229 
(2001) (arguing that “judicial . . . hostility” has undermined the ADA’s effec-
tiveness).  
 15. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 488–89 (1999) 
(holding that the plaintiffs were not “disabled” within the meaning of the ADA 
because eyeglasses improved their vision to 20/20); see also Albertson’s, Inc. v. 
Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565–66 (1999) (holding that plaintiff may not be 
protected under the ADA, despite having vision in only one eye, because his 
brain has developed subconscious adjustments to compensate for reduced 
depth perception); Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 518–19 
(1999) (holding that the plaintiff was not protected under the ADA because, 
when medicated, his high blood pressure did not prevent him from functioning 
normally). For criticism of these decisions, see, for example, Robert L. Burg-
dorf, Jr., “Substantially Limited” Protection from Disability Discrimination: 
The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition of Disa-
bility, 42 VILL. L. REV. 409, 438–512 (1997) (discussing courts’ misconstruc-
tions of the ADA’s definition of disability); Aviam Soifer, The Disability Term: 
Dignity, Default, and Negative Capability, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1279, 1299–1307 
(2000) (discussing courts’ restrictive interpretations of the “regarded as” defi-
nition); and Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The Supreme Court’s Definition of Disabil-
ity Under the ADA: A Return to the Dark Ages, 52 ALA. L. REV. 321, 325–26 
(2000) (detailing legislative history that supports determining disability with-
out considering mitigating measures and the Court’s contrary decisions). 
Commentators have also noted the restrictive way that courts have inter-
preted the ADA’s reasonable accommodation provisions. See Michelle A. Tra-
vis, Recapturing the Transformative Potential of Employment Discrimination 
Law, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 92 (2005) (arguing that, with a different in-
terpretation of “workplace essentialism,” the ADA could have greater impact); 
see also Michael Ashley Stein & Michael E. Waterstone, Disability, Disparate 
Impact, and Class Actions, 56 DUKE L.J. 861, 874–79 (2007) (arguing for in-
creased group-based challenges to workplace exclusions).  
 16. For example, in the disability law context, academics and policymak-
ers have discussed a need for some version of an ADA restoration bill. The 
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ing a conservative judiciary as undermining civil rights laws, or 
suggesting legislative fixes, is of course not unique to disability 
law.17  
The thrust of the above criticisms is to modify existing sta-
tutes or interpretations of these statutes. The predicate argu-
ment for substantive change in the law, however, reflects a be-
lief that the law as written is the same as the law in action. 
This view increasingly has been challenged.18 Neither the indi-
vidual rights guaranteed in civil rights statutes nor the larger 
antidiscrimination ideals behind them are self enforcing. Sta-
tutes can confer only rights; to be meaningful, these rights 
 
primary feature of this project would overturn Supreme Court interpretations 
of the definition of disability. See NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, RIGHTING 
THE ADA 99–125 (2004), available at http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/ 
publications/2004/pdf/righting_ada.pdf (proposing an “ADA Restoration Act,” 
and noting that “[i]ncisive and forceful legislative action is needed to address 
the dramatic narrowing and weakening of the protection provided by the 
ADA”); see also Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under Federal Anti-
Discrimination Law—What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It?, 
21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 91–92, 128–29, 162 (2000) (criticizing the 
wording of the ADA and suggesting that Congress should amend the definition 
of disability). On July 26, 2007, House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer, intro-
duced the ADA Restoration Act of 2007. H.R. 3195, 110th Cong. (2007). Repre-
sentative Tom Harkin introduced a companion bill in the Senate. S. 1881, 
110th Cong. (2007). This bill would amend ADA’s definition of disability. Id. 
 17. Civil rights advocates outside of disability law dislike a whole range of 
Court decisions. General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 
147 (1982), for example, tightening the reins on class certification in Title VII 
cases, has been criticized for beginning the end of employment discrimination 
class actions. See Melissa Hart, Will Employment Discrimination Class Ac-
tions Survive?, 37 AKRON L. REV. 813, 820 (2004) (“In the years after the Court 
emphasized the importance of adherence to the requirements of Rule 23, the 
number of class action suits filed in federal court decreased significantly.”); see 
also John A. Tisdale, Deterred Nonapplicants in Title VII Class Actions: Ex-
amining the Limits of Equal Employment Opportunity, 64 B.U. L. REV. 151, 
171 (1984) (noting the Falcon opinion’s role in the new, closer adherence to 
Rule 23 requirements in Title VII suits). On the legislative side, within the 
larger universe of employment discrimination law, Congress amended Title 
VII of the Civil Rights of 1964 in 1991 to make punitive and compensatory 
damages available to plaintiffs claiming intentional discrimination, finding 
that “additional remedies under Federal law are needed to deter . . . intention-
al discrimination in the workplace.” Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-
166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.  
§ 1981a(a)(1) (2000)). Similarly, the Fair Housing Act was amended in 1988 to 
remove the cap on punitive damages. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 
Pub. L. 100-430, § 813, 102 Stat. 1619, 1633 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 3613(c) (2000)).  
 18. See generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN 
COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991) (taking a pessimistic view of 
the ability of law to create social change without the support of the executive 
branch and the public).  
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must be defended from intrusion or violation, often in court. 
The scholarship identifying and critiquing this process increa-
singly has focused on the role and limitations of private en-
forcement,19 with public enforcement being little more than an 
afterthought or an option that is dismissed out of hand.20 Be-
cause the role of private enforcement is an important part of 
why I believe a more robust discussion of public enforcement is 
needed, in this Section I will briefly summarize the rise and fall 
of the civil rights private attorney general. I argue that the con-
tinuation of this discussion—which has not yet taken place—
should focus on public enforcement. 
A. PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT 
1. Background and Rise of Private Enforcement 
The concepts of private enforcement and the private attor-
ney general can mean several different things.21 Most broadly, 
any plaintiff whose private lawsuit vindicates the public inter-
est by deterring unlawful behavior can be viewed as one var-
iant of a “private attorney general.”22 Over time, however, an 
 
 19. See, e.g., Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, The Procedural 
Attack on Civil Rights: The Empirical Reality of Buckhannon for the Private 
Attorney General, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1087, 1131–34 (2007) (arguing that court 
decisions have negative effects for private organizations that bring civil rights 
cases); Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Perversity of Limited Civil Rights Remedies: 
The Case of “Abusive” ADA Litigation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1 (2006) (critiquing 
private enforcement of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act); Bryant 
Garth et al., The Institution of the Private Attorney General: Perspectives from 
an Empirical Study of Class Action Litigation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 353, 357 
(1988) (undertaking an empirical study of cases brought by private attorneys 
general and concluding in part that their effectiveness “depends in crucial re-
spects on a combination of private initiative and governmental commitment to 
regulation and enforcement”); Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the Private Attor-
ney General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 183, 187 (discussing court decisions that un-
dermine the private attorney general’s ability to prosecute civil rights cases); 
William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” Is—And Why It 
Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2133–37 (2004) (describing the historical de-
velopment of the private attorney general concept); Robert G. Schwemm, Pri-
vate Enforcement and the Fair Housing Act, 6 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 375, 379–
81 (1988) (illustrating the limitations of private enforcement of the Fair Hous-
ing Act); Selmi, supra note 14, at 1324–31 (arguing that the lack of govern-
mental monitoring in civil rights class actions brought by private lawyers un-
dermines their effectiveness in producing social change).  
 20. See infra notes 74–75 and accompanying text. 
 21. As academic lore has it, the term “private attorney general” was first 
used in Judge Jerome Frank’s opinion in Associated Industries v. Ickes, 134 
F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943). See Garth et al., supra note 19, at 357. 
 22. See Rubenstein, supra note 19, at 2133–35. 
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increasingly developed body of case law and literature has re-
fined the concept. Within the civil rights arena, a private attor-
ney general is a private citizen whose lawsuit, while perhaps 
benefiting her, also works to the advantage of the public by 
eliminating discriminatory behavior.23 Traditionally, federal 
civil rights statutes have offered the possibility of attorneys 
fees and damage awards (presumably shared with the plain-
tiff ’s lawyer under a contingency fee arrangement) to entice 
private lawyers to take these cases.24  
Initially a “progressive” legal reform,”25 the private attor-
ney general incentives in the enforcement of civil rights had 
support from both sides of the political aisle. Conservatives 
championed the role of the private attorney general because it 
privatized enforcement, thus shrinking the role of the federal 
government; and liberals supported private actors enforcing 
civil rights because it freed up civil rights enforcement from 
any conservative political agenda or administration.26  
Importantly, during the 1960s and 1970s, there was a pat-
tern of vigorous private civil rights enforcement by public in-
terest organizations.27 These lawyers—who in and of them-
 
 23. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (“When 
a plaintiff obtains an injunction [under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964], 
he does so not for himself alone but also as a ‘private attorney general,’ vindi-
cating a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority.”); see also H.R. 
REP. NO. 94-1558, at 1 (1976) (“The effective enforcement of Federal civil 
rights statutes depends largely on the efforts of private citizens. Although 
some agencies of the United States have civil rights responsibilities, their au-
thority and resources are limited. In many instances where these laws are vi-
olated, it is necessary for the citizen to initiate court action to correct the ille-
gality.”). 
 24. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 129 (6th ed. 1990) (subdefinition of “At-
torney General”) (“The ‘private attorney general’ concept holds that a success-
ful private party plaintiff is entitled to recovery of his legal expenses, includ-
ing attorneys fees, if he has advanced the policy inherent in public interest 
legislation on behalf of a significant class of persons.”).  
 25. Garth et al., supra note 19, at 354. 
 26. Id.; see also Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litiga-
tion: Deputizing Private Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 1384, 1387 (2000) (advocating a private enforcement model 
“that harnesses the power of private citizens to reform unconstitutional prac-
tices, particularly in the . . . area of police-related rights violations”).  
 27. These organizations are sometimes referred to as “social advocate” 
private attorneys general. See Garth et al., supra note 19, at 358 n.17. On the 
role of the NAACP in enforcing the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see generally 
JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS (1994). On the role of the ACLU 
along with the NAACP, see JOEL F. HANDLER ET AL., LAWYERS AND THE 
PURSUIT OF LEGAL RIGHTS 22–24 (1978); see also Louise G. Trubek, Crossing 
Boundaries: Legal Education and the Challenge of the “New Public Interest 
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selves were considered private attorneys general28—were gen-
erally financed by a blend of foundation and public money (the 
latter being primarily through the Legal Services Corporation 
(LSC)).29 The procedural vehicle of choice for these lawyers was 
the civil rights class action.30 There was a sort of symbiosis be-
tween the public-interest-minded private attorney general and 
the judicial and political systems.31 
2. Backlash Against Private Enforcement 
To the extent that this was a golden or even classic era,32 it 
did not last very long. The private attorney general as enforcer 
of civil rights soon faced a multilevel assault by the courts and 
Congress. In Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West 
Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources,33 the 
Court dramatically changed the ways that plaintiffs could re-
cover attorneys’ fees in civil rights cases. Rather than qualify-
 
Law,” 2005 WIS. L. REV. 455, 456–61 (characterizing the 1960s and 1970s as 
the “classic” era of public interest law). 
 28. See Rubenstein, supra note 19, at 2146–48.  
 29. See Garth et al., supra note 19, at 359–60 (noting that in the late 
1960s and 1970s the private attorney general “was supported by money from 
government and large foundations”). See also Joshua D. Blank & Eric A. 
Zacks, Dismissing the Class: A Practical Approach to the Class Action Restric-
tion on the Legal Services Corporation, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 6 (2005) (not-
ing that “the Carter administration increased funding for the [LSC] and gen-
erally supported its goals”); Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, After Public 
Interest Law, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1251, 1253–54 (“[F]ederal legal services law-
yers won almost two thirds of the eighty cases they argued to the United 
States Supreme Court through the mid-1970s, including landmark cases like 
Goldberg v. Kelly, which had far-reaching implications for the poor.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
 30. See Garth et al., supra note 19, at 355 (“The class action suit is the 
principal procedural mechanism characteristic of the private attorney gener-
al.”); see also Robert L. Carter, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a Vin-
dicator for Civil Rights, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2179, 2184–85 (1989) (“The device 
of the class action is closely associated with the figure of the ‘private attorney 
general.’”); Jack Greenberg, Civil Rights Class Actions: Procedural Means of 
Obtaining Substance, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 575, 577 (1997).  
 31. The government nurtured these lawyers and their work through the 
LSC. See Garth et al., supra note 19, at 370 (noting the role of the LSC in 
funding class action work). The revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure in 1966 contributed to a climate in which “the existence of structural op-
portunities and organizational resources fed a sense of optimism about the 
power of law to change society. A receptive federal judiciary, centralized feder-
al agencies, and robust social welfare programs permitted public interest law-
yers to extend rights, reform bureaucratic rules, and amplify government ben-
efits.” Cummings & Eagly, supra note 29, at 1253. 
 32. See Trubek, supra note 27, at 456–57. 
 33. 532 U.S. 598 (2001). 
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ing as “prevailing parties” by showing that their lawsuit was a 
catalyst for voluntary change by the defendant (the previously 
accepted “catalyst theory”), the Court held that plaintiffs must 
achieve a “material alteration of the legal relationship of the 
parties,” such as a favorable judgment on the merits or a con-
sent decree.34 This judicially imposed limitation has under-
mined the ability of the private attorney general to bring cases 
for injunctive relief.35 In other cases the Court has curtailed 
Congress’s ability to authorize private damage suits against 
states36 and restricted private rights of action to enforce the 
disparate impact regulations promulgated under Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964.37  
Perhaps unintentionally, statutory developments have also 
been unkind to the private attorney general. In 1991, Congress 
amended Title VII to allow plaintiffs claiming intentional dis-
crimination to seek compensatory and punitive damages and to 
request jury trials.38 These changes were intended to bolster 
the private enforcement scheme.39 Ironically, however, by com-
plicating the class certification inquiry, they have stymied the 
ability of the private parties and their lawyers to bring civil 
rights class actions.40  
 
 34. Id. at 604.  
 35. See Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 19, at 1088–92 (discussing Buck-
hannon’s negative effects on private organizations that bring civil rights cas-
es).  
 36. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) 
(holding that a private litigant could not bring a damage claim under Title I of 
the ADA against Alabama). 
 37. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001) (holding that 
Title VI was not intended “to create a freestanding private right of action . . . . 
[T]herefore . . . no such right of action exists.”). On the judiciary’s assault on 
the private attorney general, see Karlan, supra note 19, at 186 (“[T]he Court 
has launched a wholesale assault on one of the primary mechanisms Congress 
has used for enforcing civil rights: the private attorney general.”).  
 38. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 
1072 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a(a)(1), (c) (2000)).  
 39. See id.  
 40. See Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 407–10 (5th Cir. 
1998) (finding that, although the case could have proceeded as a class action 
before passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, that statute “ultimately rend-
er[s] this case unsuitable for class certification under Rule 23”). But see Hart, 
supra note 17, at 835–45 (arguing that real reasons courts will not certify em-
ployment class actions after the Civil Rights Act of 1991 have to do with per-
ceptions that class actions are unfair, force defendants into blackmail settle-
ments, and are no longer necessary). For a discussion of why these restrictions 
do not similarly impact government lawyers, see infra notes 146–52 and ac-
companying text. 
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The political capital and popularity of the civil rights plain-
tiffs’ bar has also faded. The first step was the dismantling of 
the (LSC). Organizations that had been effective private attor-
neys general in civil rights cases had their funds cut.41 Then, in 
1996, Congress enacted a series of restrictions on the LSC, in-
cluding prohibiting organizations that receive funding from the 
Corporation from bringing class actions.42 This was devastating 
to the LSC’s ability to prosecute large cases on the public’s be-
half.43 
The civil rights private attorney general came to be viewed 
less as a social advocate and more akin to his mass tort or se-
curities counterpart.44 The recent passage of the Class Action 
 
 41. In 1982, the Reagan administration attempted to eliminate the LSC 
altogether. Blank & Zacks, supra note 29, at 6; see also William P. Quigley, 
The Demise of Law Reform and the Triumph of Legal Aid: Congress and the 
Legal Services Corporation from the 1960’s to the 1990’s, 17 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. 
L. REV. 241, 255–56 (1998) (noting that the Reagan budget scheduled the LSC 
for termination). Although this did not happen, the LSC’s budget was conti-
nuously and dramatically reduced. See American Bar Association, Legal Ser-
vices Corporation, http://www.abanet.org/poladv/priorities/lsc.html (last vi-
sited Nov. 5, 2007) (reporting that Congress reduced the LSC budget from 
$400 million to $278 million in 1996); see also Katja Cerovsek & Kathleen 
Kerr, Opening the Doors to Justice: Overcoming the Problem of Inadequate Re-
presentation for the Indigent, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 697, 698 (2004) (“In 
2002, the federal government allocated only $329 million dollars in 2002 to the 
Legal Services Corporation (LSC), a decrease from the $400 million allocated 
in 1995. The LSC allocation is $21 million below the 1981 level and far below 
the $600 million that would be the inflationary equivalent of the 1981 levels.” 
(citations omitted) (quoting Simran Bindra & Pedram Ben-Cohen, Public Civil 
Defenders: A Right to Counsel for Indigent Civil Defendants, 10 GEO. J. ON 
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 1, 4 (2003))).  
 42. Omnibus Consolidated Recessions and Appropriations Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321. The class action restriction is found in 
section 504(a)(7) of the Act.  
 43. See BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, RESTRICTING LEGAL SERVICES: 
HOW CONGRESS LEFT THE POOR WITH ONLY HALF A LAWYER 9 (2000), availa-
ble at http://www.brennancenter.org/dynamic/subpages/atj2.pdf (“To under-
stand just how the restrictions [in the 1996 law] are hurting poor clients, it is 
useful to look at a tool that LSC-funded lawyers used to be able to use on their 
behalf: the class-action suit.”); see also Blank & Zacks, supra note 29, at 3 (“It 
is probable that since 1996, legal services lawyers have been prevented from 
filing a significant number of potential class action lawsuits.”); David C. Le-
ven, Justice for the Forgotten and Despised, 16 TOURO L. REV. 1, 12–14 (1999). 
These restrictions meant that LSC-funded entities focused more on smaller, 
individual cases; those involving unemployment benefits, for example. See 
Christine Jolls, The Role and the Functioning of Public-Interest Legal Organi-
zations in the Enforcement of Employment Laws, in EMERGING LABOR MARKET 
INSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 141, 167–68 (Richard B. 
Freeman et al. eds., 2005).  
 44. See Garth et al., supra note 19, at 360–65 (arguing that the private 
 446 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [92:434 
 
Fairness Act (CAFA)45 demonstrates the decreased political 
power of the plaintiffs’ civil rights bar. Amongst other things, 
CAFA moves certain class action cases from state to federal 
court46 on the stated rationale that the civil litigation system 
had been abused by plaintiffs’ class action lawyers.47 Various 
civil rights groups argued that CAFA was unnecessary in civil 
rights cases because there was no history of civil rights class 
action abuses in state court.48 Despite vehement pursuit, the 
civil rights community was unable to get a carve-out for civil 
rights class actions.49 
Commentators also soured on the private attorney general. 
In a series of articles in the 1980s, Professor John Coffee 
started questioning the extent to which we could “sensibly rely 
on private litigation as a method of law enforcement.”50 In criti-
 
attorney general is no longer seen as a social advocate in light of economic in-
terests); Tristin K. Green, Targeting Workplace Context: Title VII as a Tool for 
Institutional Reform, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 659, 661 (2003) (“The large money 
stakes involved in many recent cases make it tempting to view the cases as 
just another form of mass tort, wherein the parties bargain to place a price on 
the risk of workplace discrimination.”); see also Selmi, supra note 14, at 1280 
(“[T]his model—where the money that changes hands is more important than 
structural reforms—has transformed civil rights class action litigation into 
something more akin to torts or consumer class actions . . . .”). 
 45. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codi-
fied as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711–1715 (2000 & Supp. IV 
2006)). 
 46. CAFA amends 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the federal diversity jurisdiction sta-
tute, to vest the district courts with original jurisdiction of any class action in 
which the matter in controversy exceeds $5 million, exclusive of interest and 
costs, and that is between citizens of different states, or citizens of a state and 
a foreign state or its citizens and subjects. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). 
 47. 28 U.S.C. § 1711(a)(1). 
 48. Civil rights advocates even argued that CAFA would harm civil rights 
because it could move cases under more expansive state law civil rights sta-
tutes into federal court, and it would slow the resolution of federal civil rights 
cases because the expansion of federal jurisdiction would further bog down 
federal courts. See Letter from Leadership Conference on Civil Rights to U.S. 
Senate (Sept. 6, 2003), available at http://www.aclu.org/rightsofthepoor/gen/ 
13468leg20030916.html (urging opposition to S. 274, the Class Action Fairness 
Act of 2003); see also Alan B. Morrison, Removing Class Actions to Federal 
Court: A Better Way to Handle the Problem of Overlapping Class Actions, 57 
STAN. L. REV. 1521, 1540 (2005) (noting opposition of a civil rights bar to 
CAFA). 
 49. There is such a carve-out for securities class action cases, 28 U.S.C.  
§ 1332(d)(9)(A), which are already regulated by the Securities Litigation Uni-
form Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (2000)).  
 50. John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the 
Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 
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cizing the private attorney general as a legal institution that 
had not lived up to its early promise to promote the public in-
terest, Coffee noted that private lawyers may have different in-
centives than their clients, which leads to either poor represen-
tation (where plaintiffs’ lawyers sell out their clients) or 
excessive litigation (because the parties to the litigation do not 
bear its costs).51 Although Professor Coffee’s work focused on 
securities litigation, his basic criticisms have recently been ex-
tended to the civil rights private attorney general. Professor 
Michael Selmi conducted a recent study of high-profile em-
ployment class action cases with large settlements, all of which 
were brought by the private bar.52 Professor Selmi found, quite 
discouragingly, that these cases have little or no effect on stock 
price, create little or no meaningful substantive change within 
corporations, and produce only modest financial benefits for 
class members, despite the fact that the remedial focus of these 
cases was monetary relief.53 He concludes that one of the few 
things these cases actually accomplished was enriching the 
lawyers that were involved.54 
3. The ADA and the Private Attorney General 
Enacted at a time when Congress still professed a belief in 
the private attorney general but courts and the public had 
turned against it, the ADA has become a prime example of the 
concept’s limited utility. Like the Fair Housing Act and Title 
VII, the ADA is heavily dependent on private enforcement. 
Each title of the ADA allows for a private right of action.55 Un-
der Title I (discrimination in employment), an aggrieved plain-
tiff can file a lawsuit after receiving a right-to-sue letter from 
the EEOC.56 An individual may then sue for compensatory and 
 
218 (1983). 
 51. Id. at 220. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plain-
tiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of 
Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 676–90 
(1986) (noting the different incentives for plaintiff attorneys and the effects on 
social benefits). 
 52. See Selmi, supra note 14, at 1252–68. 
 53. See, e.g., id. at 1250, 1321. 
 54. Id. at 1275, 1285, 1292; Deborah R. Hensler & Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., 
Beyond “It Just Ain’t Worth It”: Alternative Strategies for Damage Class Action 
Reform, 64 LAW & COMTEMP. PROBS. 137, 137–38 (2001) (noting the negative 
effects of private class action litigation).  
 55. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 
Stat. 327 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 56. Id. 
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punitive damages and request a jury trial.57 Under Title II (dis-
crimination by public entities), an individual may file a law-
suit.58 Compensatory, but not punitive, damages are allowed.59 
Under Title III (discrimination in privately owned places of 
public accommodation), an individual may bring a private law-
suit but they are limited to injunctive relief.60 
The private attorney general project under the ADA has 
not gone well.61 Where damages are available within Title I, 
poor victims of discrimination have difficulty finding lawyers.62 
Within Title II, courts have taken a narrow view of when pri-
vate litigants can obtain compensatory damages,63 and the Su-
preme Court has drastically limited the availability of damages 
through its expansion of sovereign immunity.64 Finally, Title 
III never contained any claims for damages, and, as might be 
expected, it has the lowest number of cases of any part of the 
statute.65 
 
 57. The remedies and enforcement of Title I of the ADA are those pro-
vided by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, including the 1991 amend-
ments. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000). 
 58. Id. § 12133 (“The remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in section 
794a of Title 29 shall be the remedies, procedures, and rights that this title 
provides to any person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability in vi-
olation of [Title II].”).  
 59. See Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 189 (2002) (holding punitive 
damages unavailable under section 202 of the ADA). 
 60. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a) (2000) (“The remedies and procedures set forth in 
section 2000a-3(a) of this title are the remedies and procedures this title pro-
vides to any person who is being subjected to discrimination on the basis of 
disability in violation of this subchapter.”). The cited section only includes 
prospective injunctive relief. Id. § 2000a-3(a).  
 61. See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 19 (critiquing private enforcement of 
Title III); see also Michael Waterstone, The Untold Story of the Rest of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1807, 1853–74 (2005) (ar-
guing that Titles II and III of the ADA are underenforced). 
 62. See Louis S. Rulli & Jason A. Leckerman, Unfinished Business: The 
Fading Promise of ADA Enforcement in the Federal Courts Under Title I and 
Its Impact on the Poor, 8 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 595, 631–47 (2005).  
 63. See e.g., Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1138–39 (9th Cir. 
2001) (limiting compensatory damages under Title II to cases of “deliberate 
indifference”). 
 64. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) 
(holding that the ADA improperly infringes upon state sovereignty); see also 
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 534–34 (2004) (holding that state sovereign 
immunity was validly abrogated in claims involving access to courts under 
Title II); Michael E. Waterstone, Lane, Fundamental Rights, and Voting, 56 
ALA. L. REV. 793, 794–801 (2005) (discussing the role of the ADA in the 
Court’s sovereign immunity decisions).  
 65. As of 2001, there were 720 Title I cases that made it to the courts of 
appeals, and as of 2004, there were 197 Title II cases that made it to the 
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Despite these limitations, the popular image of private en-
forcement under the ADA has been fairly negative. The harsh 
portrayal of the ADA in the print and other media has been 
well documented.66 Besides generalized hostility to the ADA, a 
negative view of the lawyers bringing these cases and their 
clients is a theme running through media accounts of ADA cas-
es.67 
B. PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT 
This Article takes the current limitations of and hostile 
climate surrounding the private attorney general as a given.68 
Are we condemned to civil rights laws only offering a “hollow 
hope”?69 Or are there other enforcement strategies that might 
be studied and ultimately pursued? Focusing primarily on the 
ADA, this Article discusses litigation by public officials and 
new governance forms of enforcement. Both of the following 
Sections will present a more forceful role for public enforcement 
officials. 
1. Why Discuss Public Enforcement? 
The decline of the private attorney general seemingly 
creates an opportunity to refocus on the other available means 
of enforcement—that by government officials. But by and large, 
a discussion of why this is so, what it might look like, and how 
it might work, has not yet taken place. Public civil rights en-
forcement has never been much of an issue in presidential 
 
courts of appeals, and 82 Title III cases. See Waterstone, supra note 61, at 
1853. 
 66. See, e.g., Cary LaCheen, Achy Breaky Pelvis, Lumber Lung and Jugg-
ler’s Despair: The Portrayal of the Americans with Disabilities Act on Televi-
sion and Radio, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 223 (2000) (discussing the 
negative portrayal of the ADA in media). 
 67. See id. at 227–31 (“One explanation for many people’s distaste for the 
enforcement of the ADA via serial litigation is that the plaintiffs and their at-
torneys stand to financially gain from each of the suits they file.”). 
 68. It is not that these developments are unimportant—very much to the 
contrary. The ideas to revive the private attorney general are relatively 
straightforward and usually involve legislatively overruling Buckhannon and 
increasing damage awards in civil rights cases. See Kyle A. Loring, Note, The 
Catalyst Theory Meets the Supreme Court—Common Sense Takes a Vacation, 
43 B.C. L. REV. 973, 974 (2002) (proposing that Congress overturn Buckhan-
non); see also Selmi, supra note 14, at 1328–29 (suggesting a modification of 
fee incentives for private lawyers in civil rights class actions). If the legislative 
pendulum swings, however, and Congress enacts reform to make private liti-
gation more effective, the importance of public enforcement could lessen.  
 69. ROSENBERG, supra note 18, at 336–43. 
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campaigns,70 despite the fact that the means and methods of 
public enforcement of civil rights is largely a presidential pre-
rogative.71 Existing academic commentary has proposed narrow 
areas of targeted enforcement72 or focused only on the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).73 An undercur-
rent running through the larger body of work on private en-
 
 70. The “major newspapers” database in LexisNexis for coverage of the 
candidates’ positions on public enforcement of civil rights laws in the 2000 and 
2004 presidential elections includes United States newspapers with circula-
tion rates in the top fifty, and English-language newspapers published outside 
the United States that have circulation rates in their own countries’ top five 
percent or are listed as national newspapers in Benn’s World Media Dictio-
nary. In a search time frame set at one year before each election the following 
results were yielded: in the 2004 presidential election, the only campaign-
related coverage of public civil rights enforcement related to the Bush admin-
istration’s decision to transfer enforcement of partial-birth abortion legislation 
to the Civil Rights division of the Department of Justice (DOJ). See Dana Mil-
bank, Bush Signs Ban on Late-Term Abortions into Effect; Civil Rights Agency 
to Enforce Law; Lawsuits Filed, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 2003, at A23; see also Ju-
lian Borger, Fury at Bush’s Civil Rights Policing of Abortion Ban, GUARDIAN, 
Nov. 8, 2003, at 15. For information on the Justice Department’s preparations 
to enforce voting rights in the election, see Tom Brune, A Record Deployment: 
Feds Plan to Monitor Voting Rights Tuesday, NEWSDAY, Oct. 29, 2004, at A4. 
In the 2000 presidential election, there were only five campaign-related ar-
ticles mentioning public enforcement of civil rights laws, three of which re-
ported on a speech then-candidate Bush made to the NAACP in July of 2000. 
See Jena Heath, Bush Vows to Enforce Rights: He Pledges to Work to End 
Prosperity Gap, ATLANTA J. & CONST., July 11, 2000, at A3 (stating that Bush 
pledged to make civil rights enforcement a “cornerstone” of his administration 
if he won the presidency).  
 71. See, e.g., AUGUSTUS J. JONES, LAW, BUREAUCRACY AND POLITICS: THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF TITLE VI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 15–41 
(1982) (highlighting the role of presidential decision making in civil rights en-
forcement).  
 72. See, e.g., Holly James McMickle, Letting DOJ Lead the Way: Why 
DOJ’s Pattern or Practice Authority Is the Most Effective Tool to Control Racial 
Profiling, 13 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 311, 312 (2003) (arguing that the 
DOJ should control racial profiling); Sara Robenbaum & Joel Teitelbaum, Civ-
il Rights Enforcement in the Modern Healthcare System: Reinvigorating the 
Role of the Federal Government in the Aftermath of Alexander v. Sandoval, 3 
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 215, 219 (2003) (proposing to “grant civil 
rights enforcement to federal agencies with power to make expenditure deci-
sions”).  
 73. See Kathryn Moss et al., Unfunded Mandate: An Empirical Study of 
the Implementation of the Americans with Disabilities Act by the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 5 (2001); Michael 
Selmi, The Value of the EEOC: Reexamining the Agency’s Role in Employment 
Discrimination Law, 57 OHIO ST. L. J. 1, 1–4 (1996) [hereinafter Selmi, 
EEOC]. But see Michael Selmi, Public vs. Private Enforcement of Civil Rights: 
The Cases of Housing and Employment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1401, 1403 (1998) 
[hereinafter Selmi, Public vs. Private] (concluding the private bar is a more 
effective vehicle to enforce Title VII and the Fair Housing Act). 
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forcement seems to be that government enforcers do not have 
enough resources to make a difference,74 or that the political 
nature of civil rights means that public enforcement cannot be 
trusted.75  
Most public enforcement officials are essentially adminis-
trative agencies. At the most general level, there are criticisms 
that vesting administrative agencies with broad powers inevit-
ably leads to administrative capture, whereby the private in-
terests of regulated groups tend to drive policy decisions to the 
point where agencies are no longer acting in the “public inter-
est.”76 Slightly less pessimistically, public choice theorists focus 
on understanding administrative decision making as being the 
product of the relationship between interest groups and gov-
ernment officials trying to protect their own interests.77 More 
specifically, Professor Selmi has opined that the government is 
inherently poorly suited to enforce civil rights given the beha-
vioral incentives of its attorneys, including a desire for trial ex-
perience, lack of financial interest in the case, and desire to 
avoid controversial cases. 
To be sure, these views have power, and were essentially 
the rationale for the creation of the private attorney general in 
 
 74. See Adam Milani, Wheelchair Users Who Lack “Standing”: Another 
Procedural Threshold Blocking Enforcement of Titles II and III of the ADA, 39 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 69, 112–13 (2004) (noting the “small cadre of lawyers” 
in the DOJ’s Disability Rights Section). 
 75. See Leroy D. Clark, The Future Civil Rights Agenda: Speculation on 
Litigation, Legislation, and Organization, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 795, 818 (1989) 
(noting the federal government’s “abdication of aggressive enforcement role”); 
see also Bagenstos, supra note 19, at 35 (“Government enforcers have limited 
resources in the best of times, and recent years have made painfully apparent 
just how much the vigor of government enforcement can vary with the political 
winds.”); Selmi, Public vs. Private, supra note 73, at 1439 (“[T]he political na-
ture of civil rights and the nature of the attorneys entrusted with enforcing 
civil rights laws mean that the government inevitably acts cautiously—
choosing to pursue only those cases that are near certain winners or that are 
politically uncontroversial.”). 
 76. Mark C. Niles, On the Hijacking of Agencies (and Airplanes): The Fed-
eral Aviation Administration, “Agency Capture,” and Airline Security, 10 AM. 
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 381, 387–88 (2002); see Mark Seidenfeld, Bend-
ing the Rules: Flexible Regulation and Constraints on Agency Discretion, 51 
ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 459 (1999) (noting that broad agency discretion could 
mean that special interest groups would dominate).  
 77. See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 543, 561 (2000) (characterizing administrative decision making as in-
volving “interest group pressure brought to bear on bureaucrats seeking re-
wards such as job security, enhanced authority, or the favor of powerful legis-
lators upon whom the agency depends”). 
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the first place. But for several reasons, none should be conver-
sation stoppers regarding public enforcement. First, the recent 
broad and systemic undermining of the private attorney gener-
al discussed above demands an exploration of different en-
forcement alternatives. Second, it is clearly true that decisions 
about governmental enforcement priorities and resources are 
subject to the political process. Rather than an end point, how-
ever, this creates an opportunity to influence change in this 
arena. Although traditionally below the public’s political radar, 
our public officials (and by extension, the polity) are constantly 
making decisions about how to fund, organize, or even elimi-
nate public enforcement entities.78 It is therefore important to 
stimulate a discussion on why public enforcement is needed 
and how it can be effective. At the very least, this effort can 
provide guidance when the political pendulum swings in a pro–
civil rights direction.79 Finally, the view that political volatility 
renders public enforcement inherently suspect may be over-
stated. Although the evidence is somewhat mixed,80 some com-
mentators have found similar enforcement patterns in both Re-
publican and Democratic administrations.81 
Moreover, this Article is not so much arguing for an expan-
sion of the role of the public enforcement vis-à-vis the private 
attorney general (although, for the reasons I have discussed 
above, in the real world the private attorney general’s role has 
diminished). Instead, I am advocating that public enforcement 
agencies perform the role that they are already tasked with 
more effectively. I take as a given—and support—the idea that 
 
 78. See, e.g., Selmi, EEOC, supra note 73, at 57–59 (proposing to elimi-
nate the EEOC).  
 79. The author thanks Sam Bagenstos for helping to develop this point. 
 80. See TRANSACTION RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, CIVIL RIGHTS 
ENFORCEMENT BY BUSH ADMINISTRATION LAGS, http://trac.syr.edu/ 
tracreports/civright/106/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2007) (“Key data from the Justice 
Department and the federal courts show that the government’s enforcement of 
civil rights cases—an extremely rare event under all recent presidents—
sharply declined during the Bush years.”). Of late, there have also been ac-
counts of politicization of the Justice Department, and the Civil Rights Divi-
sion in particular. See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Justice Dept. Reshapes Its Civil 
Rights Mission, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2007, at A1. 
 81. See Selmi, Public vs. Private, supra note 73, at 1430–31 (concluding 
that there were no significant differences in EEOC employment discrimination 
enforcement between Republican and Democratic administrations); Jeffrey H. 
Orleans, An End to the Odyssey: Equal Athletic Opportunities for Women, 3 
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 131, 138 (1996) (noting that neither the George 
H.W. Bush nor Clinton administrations were “aggressive” in enforcing Title 
IX).  
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the ADA and other antidiscrimination statutes allow for both 
public and private enforcement.82 This diffusion of enforcement 
power avoids some capture problems, to the extent they exist.83 
To be sure, my proposals for more effective and robust public 
enforcement might take the enforcers in a more aggressive di-
rection than their “natural” incentives might otherwise take 
them. Civil rights enforcement is political,84 and strong execu-
tive leadership—something that the ADA had at its pas-
sage85—is needed to shake public enforcement agencies from 
their path dependent behaviors.86 This is especially needed 
with the ADA. Deemed the “first true civil rights legislation of 
the 21st century,”87 the Warren Court, as well as the Kennedy 
and Johnson administrations, never had the opportunity to in-
terpret this statute.88 
2. The Case for Public Enforcement 
The broad theoretical case for a renewed emphasis on pub-
lic enforcement is surprisingly easy to make. As any high 
school civics student should know, the President is responsible 
for executing the laws of the United States.89 The various en-
forcement apparatuses of the executive branch are similarly 
 
 82. A primary criticism of the Help America Vote Act has been its lack of 
a private remedy. See Michael Waterstone, Constitutional and Statutory Vot-
ing Rights for People with Disabilities, 14 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 353, 382 
(2003). 
 83. See Seidenfeld, supra note 76, at 459 (1999) (noting that broad agency 
discretion could mean that special interest groups would dominate). There is 
no literature I know of suggesting the two enforcement agencies I will be dis-
cussing below, the Department of Justice and the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission, have been “captured” in any relevant sense by any entity 
under their jurisdiction.  
 84. Professor Selmi likely shares this view. See Selmi, Public v. Private, 
supra note 73, at 1444 (discussing the “politically infused” nature of civil 
rights litigation). 
 85. President George H.W. Bush was a visible supporter of the ADA, and 
used his political capital to help ensure the Act’s passage. See Robert L. Burg-
dorf Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of a 
Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 414 
n.3, 420, 437, 495, 520 (1991).  
 86. See infra Part II.A (defining the “path dependent behaviors”). 
 87. Letter from the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights to J. Dennis 
Hastert, Speaker of the House, U.S. House of Representatives (July 26, 2002), 
available at http:// www.nlchp.org/ content/pubs/CR_voting_letter.pdf. 
 88. On the civil rights enforcement efforts of the Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations, see infra note 100. 
 89. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 4 (“[H]e shall take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed.”).  
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tasked.90 When the government enforces any set of laws, it acts 
as a representative of its people. Therefore, when the govern-
ment enforces the antidiscrimination ideals contained in civil 
rights statutes, it expresses the will of the people to live in a 
more just society. This expressive function of the law cannot be 
completely outsourced to private actors91 and is lost when civil 
rights lawsuits become profit-driven enterprises.92 More global-
ly, when the private market fails to provide a particular public 
good,93 the government has an obligation to do so for the bet-
terment of its people.94  
As Gerald Rosenberg recognized over a decade ago, the ex-
ecutive branch’s support is a necessary condition for meaning-
ful change in the civil rights arena.95 Experience suggests that 
Rosenberg is right. Before Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 was passed, African Americans were customarily denied 
access to public places in the Jim Crow South.96 The Civil 
Rights Act played a major role in ending these pernicious prac-
tices.97 Similarly, during that same era, literacy tests and other 
forms of subtle and overt discrimination regularly denied Afri-
can Americans the right to vote.98 The Voting Rights Act has 
been judged a historical success in eliminating overt racial dis-
 
 90. See Larry W. Yackle, A Worthy Champion for Fourteenth Amendment 
Rights: The United States in Parens Patriae, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 111, 116–17 
(1997). 
 91. See Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 
VA. L. REV. 1649, 1652 (2000) (dismissing the relationship between legal sig-
nals and societal expectations); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function 
of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021–25 (1996). 
 92. See Green, supra note 44, at 722–23 (discussing the desirability of the 
EEOC’s role in protecting the public interest through Title VII systemic cases). 
 93. In this case, one form of the “public good” would be meritorious cases 
that would enforce the civil rights laws. As will be discussed below in more de-
tail, the private market is not adequately serving this public good. See Julie 
Davies, Federal Civil Rights Practice in the 1990’s: The Dichotomy Between 
Reality and Theory, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 197, 238, 242 (1997) (observing that the 
market for civil rights class actions is “dramatically underserved” and merito-
rious claims are not being brought).  
 94. See Jolls, supra note 43, at 9.  
 95. ROSENBERG, supra note 18, at 36.  
 96. See BROOKS ET AL., supra note 3, at 267 (“Prior to the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, racial segregation was an accepted way of American life.”).  
 97. See, e.g., HARRELL R. RODGERS, JR. & CHARLES S. BULLOCK, III, LAW 
AND SOCIAL CHANGE 66 (1972) (discussing the impact of the Civil Rights Act 
in the South); Drew S. Days, III, “Feedback Loop”: The Civil Rights Act of 1964 
and Its Progeny, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 981, 981 (2005) (“This legislation has 
brought broad, positive change and progress to American society.”).  
 98. See BROOKS ET AL., supra note 3, at 560–61.  
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crimination in voting.99 The successes of these statutes have 
been in large part attributed to aggressive enforcement by pub-
lic enforcement authorities.100 
I now turn to the issue of what exactly public enforcement 
authorities can and should be doing differently. While I am 
specifically focused on the ADA, the arguments herein should 
offer valuable insights for the larger universe of antidiscrimi-
nation and civil rights law. 
II.  STRUCTURAL LITIGATION   
The traditional civil litigation model is bilateral and seeks 
adjudication of specific grievances. This type of case is relative-
ly self-contained and primarily asks for retrospective reme-
dies.101 What has been alternatively termed public law, struc-
tural, or systemic litigation, in contrast, is different.102 
Although there is no uniform definition for this type of litiga-
tion, I will use it to describe cases that are filed against large 
corporations or government entities or other large power struc-
tures, and seek structural remedies, meaning that they invoke 
the power of the courts to oversee institutional reform.103 They 
 
 99. See id. at 577–78; Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman, Editors’ 
Introduction to QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING 
RIGHTS ACT, 1965–1990, at 3, 3 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 
1994). 
 100. See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS 
ENFORCEMENT EFFORT 10 (1971) (“Within a few months after enactment, the 
Department . . . brought several enforcement actions that tested the constitu-
tionality of the public accommodations law.”); see also RICHARD CORTNER, 
CIVIL RIGHTS AND PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS: THE HEART OF ATLANTA MOTEL 
AND MCCLUNG CASES 27 (2001) (“If the enforcement of the Civil Rights Act 
was to occur in the courts, rather in the streets as President Johnson feared, 
the primary burden would fall on the Civil Rights Division of the Department 
of Justice, headed by Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall.”). Cortner 
proceeds throughout this book to note the key contributions made by the Civil 
Rights Division and the efforts of Marshall in particular. See generally id. 
 101. See Abe Chayes, The Role of Justice in Public Law Litigation, 89 
HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1282 (1976). 
 102. Commentators use these terms interchangeably. See JOHN C. 
JEFFRIES ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS: ENFORCING THE CONSTITUTION 745 
(2000) (“Suits of this type have come to be known as ‘structural reform,’ or ‘in-
stitutional’ or ‘public law’ litigation.”). I will do the same. 
 103. See id. (“Other cases, however, involve broader attacks on the way 
government does business. Such suits are typically brought as class actions for 
injunctive relief. Often they seek systemic reform of government operations or 
procedures, relief that far exceeds any preventative or compensatory objective 
that would make whole any particular plaintiff before the court.”); see also 
Maimon Schwarzchild, Public Law by Private Bargain: Title VII Consent De-
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are usually brought as class actions.104 Although certain com-
mentators have questioned the procedural and remedial fair-
ness of these institutional cases,105 there is a strong counterar-
gument if not consensus about the propriety and effectiveness 
of structural reform litigation.106 
In any event, the effectiveness of structural litigation in re-
forming institutions cannot be disputed. Structural litigation 
campaigns have desegregated schools,107 reformed prisons,108 
attacked deplorable health care conditions in institutions,109 
challenged police abuse,110 and targeted discrimination in large 
 
crees and the Fairness of Negotiated Institutional Reform, 1984 DUKE L. J. 
887, 888–90 (discussing how large-scale Title VII lawsuits against private 
companies are public law litigation, whereby courts take responsibility for ex-
tensive institutional reforms while acting independently of the adversarial 
process).  
 104. See JEFFRIES ET AL., supra note 102, at 745. 
 105. See Gerald E. Frug, The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L. 
REV. 715, 733 (1978) (criticizing institutional cases as examples of judicial vi-
olations of the separation of powers); see also Robert F. Nagel, Separation of 
Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REV. 661, 
661–62 (1978) (criticizing the judiciary’s use of new and expansive remedies). 
 106. See Chayes, supra note 101, at 1316 (arguing that involving courts 
and judges in public law litigation is legitimate and inevitable if justice is to be 
done in an increasingly regulated society); see also Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: 
The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1–4 (1979) (arguing that structural 
litigation serves as a means for the judicial branch to articulate constitutional 
values, which is necessary to create change in large-scale public organiza-
tions).  
 107. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that ra-
cial segregation in public schools was unconstitutional). 
 108. See, e.g., Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (per curiam) (affirm-
ing the lower court’s holding that racial segregation of prisons violated the 
Equal Protection Clause); see also Greenberg, supra note 30, at 577 (“Since the 
federal class action rule was revised in 1966, prisoners’ rights litigation has 
utilized the mechanism of class action to bring broad relief to inmates and de-
tainees throughout the country.”). 
 109. See, e.g., N.Y. State Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 393 F. 
Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (addressing conditions in the Willowbrook institu-
tion for the developmentally disabled in New York City). 
 110. The Department of Justice has negotiated consent decrees with vari-
ous police departments, requiring, among other things, revision of use-of-force 
policies. See, e.g., Consent Decree at 23–27, United States v. City of Los An-
geles, 288 F.3d 391 (9th Cir. 2002) (No. 00-11769 GAF (RCX)), available at 
http://www.cacd.uscourts.gov (follow “search site” hyperlink; search “00-
11769”; follow the hyperlink for the first result); see also ROBERT C. DAVIS ET 
AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, TURNING NECESSITY INTO VIRTUE: PITTSBURGH’S 
EXPERIENCE WITH A FEDERAL CONSENT DECREE 7–8 (2002), http://www.vera 
.org/publication_pdf/180_326.pdf. 
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private employers.111 Historically, these cases have been 
brought by both public and private enforcement authorities.112 
Despite their effectiveness, systemic and class litigation in 
civil rights cases have declined in recent years. Reports kept by 
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts show a 
decline in civil rights class action filings. From July 1983 
through June 1984, civil rights class actions constituted a size-
able amount of the class action suits filed in federal court.113 
From October 2003 through September 2004, this number was 
down to 11.2%.114 The total number of civil rights class actions 
went down, from 369 from July 1983 through June 1984 to 241 
in 2004 (despite the passage of the ADA in 1991).115 As dis-
cussed above, these numbers can be partially explained by the 
reduced ability of the private attorney general to bring and 
prosecute these kinds of systemic, broad cases.116 Public en-
forcement officials have not picked up the slack. From July 
1978 through June 1979, the United States filed 8 civil rights 
class actions; from July 1983 through June 1984, it filed 1, and 
from October 2003 through September 2004, it filed 5.117  
 
 111. See, e.g., United States v. Bethlehem Steel, 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 
1971) (ordering an employer to desegregate job assignments); EEOC v. Int’l 
Union of Elevator Constructors Local 5, 398 F. Supp. 1237, 1264–65 (E.D. Pa. 
1975) (ordering an employer to develop training programs for minority em-
ployees); see also Schwarzchild, supra note 103, at 890 (“Title VII litigation is 
an excellent example of ‘public law’ or ‘structural’ litigation.”). 
 112. For an example of cases brought by public authorities, see supra notes 
110–11 and accompanying text. For a classic and fascinating narrative of a lit-
igation campaign waged by the NAACP, see generally GREENBERG, supra note 
27. 
 113. See 1984 DIR. ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. 486–88 tbl.X-5 [herei-
nafter 1984 ANN. REP.].  
 114. See 2004 DIR. ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. tbl.X-5 [hereinafter 
2004 ANN. REP.], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2004/appendices/ 
x5.pdf. The trends are similar within the subcategory of employment discrimi-
nation law. While 1174 employment class actions were filed in federal court 
from July 1975 through June 1976, the number was only 73 in 2002. Hart, su-
pra note 17, at 820.  
 115. See supra notes 113 & 114. 
 116. John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Em-
ployment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1019–21 (1991) (at-
tributing virtual disappearance of class action employment litigation to 
changes in legal rules, particularly the Court’s decisions in East Texas Freight 
System and Falcon); Garth et al., supra note 19, at 371 (noting that the eco-
nomic incentive of attorney fees does not serve a sufficient incentive for law-
yers to bring civil rights class action cases); see supra Part I.B.2.  
 117. See 1979 DIR. ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. 674 tbl.X-5; 1984 ANN. 
REP., supra note 113; 2004 ANN. REP., supra note 114. 
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A. LACK OF ADA STRUCTURAL LITIGATION 
These general trends are exacerbated in the ADA context. 
There has been a notable lack of systemic and class action liti-
gation under the ADA, particularly with regard to the law’s 
employment provisions.118 Very recently, there have been sev-
eral large class action lawsuits brought by private lawyers al-
leging discrimination on the basis of sex,119 but none relating to 
disability.120 
There are several executive branch agencies charged with 
public enforcement of the ADA.121 I will focus my discussion on 
the EEOC and Department of Justice (DOJ), which have the 
most robust statutory role for public enforcement.122 Generally 
speaking, these agencies have not made structural litigation a 
high priority. The EEOC has acknowledged as much, noting its 
failure to bring and develop broad, systemic cases (while recog-
nizing that they could serve the public interest better by doing 
a better job).123 Commentators have confirmed that the EEOC 
has generally shied away from bringing large systematic cases, 
both in the ADA and larger civil rights contexts.124 The DOJ’s 
 
 118. See Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimina-
tion, and Reasonable Accommodation, 46 Duke L.J. 1, 19 (1996) (“Few of the 
cases brought under the ADA are class actions . . . .”); Stein & Waterstone, su-
pra note 15, at 890–94 (arguing that there is a lack of class action litigation 
under the ADA).  
 119. See, e.g., Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 474 F.3d 1214, 1233 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(certifying a large class of female workers bringing Title VII claims). 
 120. While Wal-Mart, like other large defendants, has been sued for disa-
bility discrimination by private lawyers, these cases have typically not been 
brought as class actions. See Wal-Mart Watch, Issues: Discrimination, http:// 
walmartwatch.com/issues/discrimination (last visited Nov. 5, 2007) (present-
ing information on only smaller, individual discrimination suits).  
 121. These include the EEOC (Title I), the DOJ (Title II), the Department 
of Transportation (Titles II and III), the Department of Agriculture (Title II), 
the Department of Education (Title II), the Department of Health and Human 
Services (Title II), the Department of Housing and Urban Development (Title 
II), the Department of the Interior (Title II), the Department of Labor (Title 
II), and the United States Access Board (Titles II and III). Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 122. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12113, 12117(a), 12188 (2000). 
 123. See LESLIE E. SILVERMAN ET AL., EEOC, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, 
SYSTEMIC TASK FORCE REPORT 1 (2006), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/ 
abouteeoc/task_reports/systemic.pdf (“[W]e found that EEOC does not consis-
tently and proactively identify systemic discrimination. Instead, the agency 
typically focuses on individual allegations raised in charges.”).  
 124. See Selmi, EEOC, supra note 73, at 16 (“Consistent with the EEOC’s 
history and current litigation trends, a relatively small percentage of the cases 
were filed as class allegations—forty-seven of the cases which constituted 
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enforcement efforts have also come under criticism for being 
“overly cautious, reactive, and lacking any coherent and unify-
ing national strategy.”125 
Aside from improving compliance, large-scale litigation ef-
forts can also serve an important law development function. 
For example, in the early years of Title VII, the Civil Rights 
Division of the DOJ concentrated on establishing that Title VII 
prohibited not only purposeful discrimination but also practices 
with a discriminatory impact.126 The DOJ was a plaintiff in 
four cases that made it to the court of appeals level, and estab-
lished early precedent that neutral practices with a disparate 
impact violated Title VII.127 This line of cases was a key part of 
the road to the Supreme Court’s decision in Griggs v. Duke 
Power Co.,128 which “held that facially neutral ‘practices, proce-
dures, or tests’ that are discriminatory in effect cannot be used 
to preserve the ‘status quo’ of employment discrimination.”129 
In contrast, despite the fact that the EEOC promulgated regu-
lations explicitly stating that disparate impact is covered under 
 
13.5% of the claims.”); see also Moss et al., supra note 73, at 18 (discussing 
Professor Selmi’s data and conclusions). In the ADA failure to hire context dis-
cussed infra, only four briefs reflecting EEOC participation as a plaintiff dem-
onstrated representation of more than an individual applicant. See EEOC, 
Commission Appellate and Amicus Briefs (Sept. 6, 2007), http://www.eeoc.gov/ 
litigation/appbriefs.html (providing a search mechanism for EEOC positions 
that “discuss significant legal issues which could affect the manner in which 
employment laws are interpreted”).  
 125. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, PROMISES TO KEEP: A DECADE OF 
FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 2 (2000) 
(examining the enforcement of the ADA between 1990 and 1999 by using sta-
tistical and other federal agency data). Regarding Title II of the ADA, the re-
port also argues that the DOJ has not taken sufficiently strong positions in 
important litigation. Id. at 4–6; see also infra notes 137, 231–35 and accompa-
nying text (noting the limited use of the DOJ’s power to bring ADA cases in 
the public interest).  
 126. David L. Rose, Twenty-Five Years Later: Where Do We Stand on Equal 
Employment Opportunity Law Enforcement?, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1121, 1139 
(1989).  
 127. See Local 189 United Papermakers and Paperworkers v. United 
States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Sheet Metal Workers 
Int’l Ass’n, Local No. 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969); United States v. Hayes 
Int’l Corp., 415 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1969); Local 53, Int’l Ass’n of Heat & Frost 
Insulators v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969). But see Int’l Bhd. of Team-
sters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 353–54 (1977) (“[A]n otherwise neutral, 
legitimate seniority system does not become unlawful under Title VII simply 
because it may perpetuate pre-Act discrimination”).  
 128. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
 129. Rose, supra note 126, at 1140–41 (citing Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430). 
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Title I of the ADA,130 neither the EEOC nor the DOJ have tak-
en steps to develop the case law in this area.131 
This underwhelming public enforcement at the federal lev-
el has been paralleled at the state level. Outside of a few se-
lected states, federal protection is as strong as or stronger than 
what is provided by state law.132 And while one commentator 
has urged a move to the state law battlefield to enforce disabili-
ty rights,133 there are few examples of state public enforcement 
officials bringing systemic cases under state or federal law.134 
Because this is an area where federal protection has, at least 
on paper, been out in front of state law, and because many 
state courts have looked to the ADA for guidance on interpret-
ing state law,135 it is important for federal enforcement officials 
to take the lead in litigating ADA cases. 
 
 130. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(c) (2007) (providing a potential defense to the 
charge of disparate impact). 
 131. On the lack of ADA disparate impact litigation, see Stein & Water-
stone, supra note 15, at 889–90.  
 132. See Alex Long, State Anti-Discrimination Law as a Model for Amend-
ing the Americans with Disabilities Act, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 597, 601–02 (2004); 
see also Sande L. Buhai, In the Meantime: State Protection of Disability Civil 
Rights, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1065 app. (2004) (listing state disability antidi-
scrimination laws). Some states, like California and Minnesota, offer more ge-
nerous definitions of disability than have been interpreted under federal law. 
Long, supra, at 629–30; see also CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12926.1(a) (West 2005); 
see also MINN. STAT. § 363A.03(12) (2006). 
 133. Buhai, supra note 132, at 1066. 
 134. There are exceptions. Then New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer 
negotiated consent decrees with Priceline.com and the Ramada Franchise Sys-
tems, asserting that their respective websites were inaccessible to the blind 
and visually impaired in violation of state and federal law. See Assurance of 
Discontinuance, In re Ramada Franchise Systems, Inc. (Att’y Gen. of the State 
of N.Y., Aug. 12, 2004), available at http://www.icdri.org/News/Ramada% 
20AOD; Assurance of Discontinuance, In re Priceline.com (Att’y Gen. of the 
State of N.Y. Apr. 8, 2004), available at http://www.icdri.org/News/ 
Priceline%20AOD. Similarly, the Massachusetts Attorney General recently 
brought a complaint under state law against a bus company for refusing car-
riage to a blind couple because the husband used a guide dog. This case re-
sulted in over $60,000 in damages and injunctive relief. Commonwealth v. 
Fung Wah Bus Transp., Inc., No. 05-BPA-00758, 2007 WL 2068081, at *1–2 
(Mass. Comm’n Against Discrimination July 9, 2007). 
 135. See, e.g., Grant v. May Dep’t Stores, 786 A.2d 580, 583–84 (D.C. Cir. 
2001) (“We have considered [federal] decisions construing the ADA as persua-
sive in our decisions construing comparable sections of [the District of Colum-
bia Human Rights Act].”); Garcia v. Allen, 28 S.W.3d 587, 598 (Tex. App. 2000) 
(using Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999), as persuasive when in-
terpreting the Texas statute’s definition of disability). 
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B. A MORE STRUCTURAL LITIGATION ROLE FOR PUBLIC 
ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES 
There are both legislative and regulatory bases for a 
stronger structural litigation role for ADA public enforcement 
authorities. The EEOC and DOJ are both authorized to bring 
ADA lawsuits that are in the public interest. The EEOC, re-
sponsible for enforcing Title I against private employers, has 
the ability to bring suit as a plaintiff, and its claims are not li-
mited to the complaints made by a charging party.136 Similarly, 
the DOJ is authorized to bring cases involving a “pattern or 
practice” of discrimination by public employers under Title I,137 
although it appears it has only done so once.138 The DOJ’s en-
forcement powers under Title II in cases involving public em-
ployers are the same as they are in the Title I context.139 Under 
Title III, the DOJ can bring lawsuits if it has reasonable cause 
to believe that any person or group of persons is engaged in a 
pattern or practice of discrimination, or in any other case that 
raises an issue of general public importance.140 
Apart from being allowed to play a structural role, public 
enforcement authorities are uniquely suited to fill the structur-
al enforcement gap. Most of the limitations that apply to pri-
vate attorneys general do not apply to public enforcement au-
thorities. These strengths of public enforcement authorities vis-
 
 136. EEOC v. Caterpillar, Inc., 409 F.3d 831, 833 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[A] suit 
by the EEOC is not confined ‘to claims typified by those of the charging par-
ty.’” (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 331 
(1980))); see also EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 291 (2002) 
(“[O]nce a charge is filed . . . the EEOC is in command of the process.”). 
 137. The DOJ’s role under Title I of the ADA (as well as that of the EEOC) 
is determined by various provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, including 
the 1991 amendments set forth in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 42 U.S.C.  
§ 12117 (2000). These provisions provide that the EEOC should refer employ-
ment cases involving governments, governmental agencies, or political subdi-
visions to the Attorney General. Id. § 2000e-5(f ). The Attorney General is fur-
ther authorized to bring civil actions whenever there is “reasonable cause to 
believe that any person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice 
of resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the rights secured by” the ADA. Id. 
§ 2000e-6(a).  
 138. See Davoll v. Webb, 194 F.3d 1116, 1124 (10th Cir. 1999) (alleging 
disability discrimination by the Denver police department).  
 139. See 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (2000) (stating that enforcement of Title II is 
the same as 29 U.S.C. § 794a, the Rehabilitation Act); 29 U.S.C. § 794a (2000) 
(providing that enforcement provisions are the same as those found in the Civ-
il Rights Act of 1964). 
 140. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b)(1)(B) (2000). 
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à-vis the private attorney general help to assess when public 
officials should devote resources to systemic litigation.  
First, by not being tied to attorneys’ fees and a case’s abili-
ty to pay for itself, public enforcement authorities can truly 
bring and prosecute cases in the public interest. Therefore, 
whereas private attorneys general increasingly can no longer 
afford to bring large class action civil rights cases,141 public en-
forcement authorities can. Systemic litigation is expensive, and 
few private lawyers can match the government’s resources 
when it decides to use them in a particular direction.142 
Freedom from attorneys’ fees and damages as a means of 
financing litigation also allows public enforcement officials to 
bring cases for injunctive relief, which has traditionally been 
the structural remedy of choice.143 Professor Selmi has recently 
criticized privately brought employment discrimination class 
action lawsuits as being too focused on obtaining large settle-
ments, which primarily enriched the plaintiffs’ lawyers.144 
Lawsuits brought by public enforcement authorities that focus 
on institutional injunctive relief as opposed to damage awards 
could help revive the public nature of these types of civil rights 
class actions.145 
 
 141. Davies, supra note 93, at 238 (“In the civil rights class action context, 
for example, there is higher demand than supply of attorneys because the at-
torneys can only afford to litigate cases that are virtually guaranteed to win.”); 
see also Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 19, at 41–42 (“Buckhannon reduces 
litigation not by promoting settlement, but by discouraging plaintiffs from 
bringing meritorious but expensive claims in the first place . . . .”); Davies, su-
pra note 93, at 258 (noting private civil rights class actions have gone down 
because of financial factors). 
 142. The extent to which these agencies are funded or defunded is essen-
tially a political decision. See supra notes 78–81.  
 143. Fiss, supra note 106, at 2 (“The structural suit is one in which a judge, 
confronting a state bureaucracy over values of constitutional dimension, un-
dertakes to restructure the organization to eliminate a threat to those values 
posed by the present institutional arrangements. The injunction is the means 
by which these reconstructive directives are transmitted.”); see also David Ru-
denstine, Institutional Injunctions, 4 CARDOZO L. REV. 611, 616 (1983) (noting 
the importance of institutional injunctions and arguing that they are not in 
conflict with federalism and democratic process values); Margo Schlanger, Civ-
il Rights Injunctions over Time: A Case Study of Jail and Prison Court Orders, 
81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550, 561–64 (2006) (detailing the transformative effect of 
injunctions in prisons).  
 144. See Selmi, supra note 14, at 1280.  
 145. Within civil rights law generally and disability law in particular, these 
suits do happen. They are often brought by public interest organizations. For 
example, in Barden v. City of Sacramento, 292 F.3d 1073, 1075 (9th Cir. 2002), 
Disability Rights Advocates, a prominent nonprofit law firm dedicated to 
bringing high profile ADA cases, sued the city of Sacramento for inaccessible 
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Second, class action structural litigation has been curtailed 
by the Supreme Court’s decision in General Telephone Co. of the 
Southwest v. Falcon, which held that named class representa-
tives had to demonstrate a greater unanimity of interest with 
the proposed class.146 This tightened Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure Rule 23’s reins for class certification: plaintiffs who suf-
fered discrimination in hiring, for example, cannot represent 
plaintiffs who were discriminated against in promotion deci-
sions.147 This decision, combined with the 1991 amendments to 
the Civil Rights Act that allowed Title VII plaintiffs increased 
damages and jury trials, has led courts to view employment 
cases as less amenable to class treatment.148 This restricts pri-
vate litigants, however, far more than the government, particu-
larly in disability cases.  
Under the ADA, both the EEOC and DOJ have far more 
procedural breathing room to pursue class-type relief than pri-
 
sidewalks. The requested relief was a structural injunction requiring the City 
to formulate a plan for sidewalk accessibility. Id. But these cases are the ex-
ception, not the norm. Public interest organizations do not have adequate staff 
or funds to bring all of these cases, and government officials have not taken 
the lead in doing so. See Bagenstos, supra note 61, at 35. The most prominent 
disability-based public interest organizations are in large cities. Large seg-
ments of the country have no similar operations. In Mississippi, for example, 
the largest disability rights organization has no lawyers. Mississippi Coalition 
for Citizens with Disabilities, http://www.mscoalition.com/ (follow “Staff and 
Board” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 5, 2007). Additionally, Mississippi’s Pro-
tection and Advocacy Office has only one staff attorney and does not typically 
litigate. Mississippi Protection and Advocacy System, http://www.mspas.com/ 
staff.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2007). 
 146. 457 U.S. 147, 158 (1982). 
 147. Griffin v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1476, 1493–94 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding 
that a class could not be certified when one representative complained promo-
tion practices were discriminatory and others alleged the qualification exam 
was discriminatory); see also Wagner v. Taylor, 836 F.2d 578, 595–96 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987) (holding supervisors are not in the same class as nonsupervisors 
because they may have conflicting interests); Roby v. St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co., 
775 F.2d 959, 962–63 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding that employees could not 
represent a class of individuals affected by the railroad’s promotion policies or 
those who were discharged for violating company rules because the employees’ 
complaint did not derive from either of these circumstances). 
 148. See Hart, supra note 17, at 820 (“In the years after the Court empha-
sized the importance of adherence to the requirements of Rule 23, the number 
of class action suits filed in federal court decreased significantly.”); see also 
Scotty Shively, Resurgence of the Class Action Lawsuit in Employment Dis-
crimination Cases: New Obstacles Presented by the 1991 Amendments to the 
Civil Rights Act, 23 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 925, 935 (2001) (indicating 
that Falcon ended widespread certification of across-the-board class actions in 
discrimination lawsuits “because [i]t was no longer sufficient for one plaintiff, 
represented by one law firm, to allege across-the-board discrimination”).  
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vate litigants. In General Telephone Co., the Supreme Court 
held that the EEOC could seek class-wide relief for sex discrim-
ination under Title VII without certification as a class repre-
sentative under Rule 23.149 The same is true under the ADA,150 
which has allowed the EEOC, in the few class-type cases it has 
brought, to escape thorny class issues of individualized inquir-
ies that courts usually view as necessary to determine disabili-
ty.151 Similarly, when the DOJ brings “pattern or practice” 
suits under Title I of the ADA, the government, when establish-
ing its prima facie case, is not required to show individual dis-
crimination with respect to each person for whom it seeks re-
lief.152  
Third, the ability of private litigants to sue state govern-
ments has been dramatically curtailed by the Court’s recent 
“new federalism” jurisprudence. The ADA has been at the cen-
ter of the development of this body of law. In Board of Trustees 
of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, the Court held that, 
under the principle of state sovereign immunity, individuals 
may not sue the state for damages under Title I of the ADA.153 
Insofar as the ADA is concerned, the Court has retreated from 
this principle somewhat in Tennessee v. Lane154 and Goodman 
v. Georgia,155 where it held that individuals may sue state enti-
 
 149. 446 U.S. 318, 319, 326, 330 (1980) (“When the EEOC acts, albeit at 
the behest of and for the benefit of specific individuals, it acts also to vindicate 
the public interest in preventing employment discrimination. . . . Forcing 
EEOC civil actions into Rule 23 model would in many cases distort the Rule as 
it is commonly interpreted . . . . Rule 23(a) imposes the prerequisites of nume-
rosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. When consi-
dered in the light of these requirements, it is clear that the Rule was not de-
signed to apply to EEOC actions brought in its own name for the enforcement 
of federal law.”). 
 150. See, e.g., EEOC v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 2d 935, 937 
(D. Minn. 2002) (“The EEOC may properly bring the current ADA class action 
lawsuit notwithstanding the Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 class requirements.”).  
 151. Id. at 938 (holding that the status of the EEOC as a plaintiff obviates 
the argument for an individualized inquiry attack on class certification). For 
an alternative view as to how courts should conceive of group identity through 
the lens of pandisability, see Stein & Waterstone, supra note 15, at 905–16. 
 152. United States v. City and County of Denver, 943 F. Supp. 1304, 1309 
(D. Colo. 1996) (“In seeking to protect the public’s interest, it is sufficient that 
the government show specific evidence of company discrimination regarding 
some of the employees that it seeks to represent, and that a broad-based policy 
of employment discrimination existed.” (quoting Coe v. Yellow Freight Sys., 
646 F.2d 444, 449 n.1 (10th Cir. 1981) (citations omitted))).  
 153. 531 U.S. 356, 374 n.9 (2001). 
 154. 541 U.S. 509 (2004). 
 155. 546 U.S. 151, 151, 157–60 (2006). 
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ties for damages under Title II where they are seeking to vindi-
cate fundamental rights. It is still uncertain how far this excep-
tion will extend. Under Garrett, individuals may sue state offi-
cials for prospective injunctive relief under Ex parte Young,156 
but the limitation on damage remedies further undercuts the 
financial ability of private lawyers to bring these kinds of cases. 
In the ADA context this is significant, because state govern-
ments are a major provider of programs, services, and activities 
to people with disabilities.157 Again, however, these discourag-
ing restrictions do not apply to the government, which can 
bring cases for damages regardless of new federalism sovereign 
immunity rules.158 
If the government possesses an array of systemic advan-
tages to the private attorney general in bringing structural cas-
es, how should it use this power? Public enforcement officials 
should focus on bringing cases where the profit motive for 
plaintiffs and private attorneys is low (either because of the 
lack of damage remedy or limitations on attorneys’ fees recov-
ery), noncompliance appears to be systemic, case law is undeve-
loped, and individual plaintiffs will have standing difficulties 
challenging various forms of discrimination. I now turn to dis-
cussing specific ways, in the context of disability litigation, that 
the government should take an active role in bringing structur-
al litigation.  
1. Employment-Hiring Cases 
Before the enactment of the ADA, people with disabilities 
existed only at the fringes of the labor market.159 The ADA 
 
 156. 209 U.S. 123, 154 (1908) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment does 
not protect state officials from suit if the suit would enjoin the official from en-
forcing an unconstitutional statute); see also Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 
1019, 1025–26 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that the plaintiffs’ ADA Title II claims 
for prospective injunctive relief fell within the Ex parte Young exception to 
state sovereign immunity).  
 157. According to a 2005 study, 32% (63 out of 197) of Title II cases brought 
before the courts of appeals involved state actors as defendants. See Water-
stone, supra note 61, at 1861–62. 
 158. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 n.9.  
 159. According to the federal government’s National Health Information 
Survey, when disability was defined as an impairment that imposes limita-
tions on any life activity the employment rate for working-age people with dis-
abilities was 49% in 1990. See H. STEPHEN KAYE, IMPROVED EMPLOYMENT 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES 9 fig.1 (2003), available at 
http://sdc.ucsf.edu/pub_listing.php?pub_type=report; see also Walter Y. Oi, 
Employment and Benefits for People with Diverse Disabilities, in DISABILITY, 
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hoped to address this disparity and, by working to eliminate 
employment discrimination, increase the number of people with 
disabilities in the workplace. Unfortunately, its success in 
doing so has been limited.160 
To be sure, the Supreme Court’s definition of disability has 
dramatically limited the number of potential employees that 
can invoke the statute’s protections.161 But there are still 
groups of people that consistently qualify as meeting the defini-
tion of disability.162 Regarding these groups, one reason that 
the reach of the ADA’s employment law provisions have been 
limited is the infrequency with which they are used to open 
employment opportunities at the hiring stage. Even before the 
ADA was passed, researchers began to chart the changing na-
ture of employment discrimination litigation, noting that anti-
discrimination laws protecting women and minorities were 
used predominantly to protect the existing positions of incum-
bent workers.163 This trend is even stronger under the ADA, 
where failure-to-hire cases are dramatically outnumbered by 
discharge or accommodation for existing employee cases.164 
It is in one sense understandable that there are not more 
hiring cases. Legal prohibitions against hiring discrimination 
 
WORK AND CASH BENEFITS 103, 121 (Jerry L. Mashaw et al. eds., 1996) (show-
ing that the percentage of people with disabilities with jobs in 1986 was 33%). 
 160. See THE DECLINE IN EMPLOYMENT OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES: A 
POLICY PUZZLE 1–2 (Richard V. Burkhauser & David C. Stapleton eds., 2003) 
[hereinafter DECLINE IN EMPLOYMENT]; see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, Has the 
Americans with Disabilities Act Reduced Employment for People with Disabili-
ties?, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 527, 528–30 (2004) (reviewing DECLINE 
IN EMPLOYMENT, supra). 
 161. See Amy L. Allbright, Special Feature: 2003 Employment Decisions 
Under the ADA Title I—Survey Update, 28 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. 
REP. 319, 320 (2004) (“A clear majority of the employer wins in this survey 
were due to employee’s failure to show that they had a protected disability.”).  
 162. Individuals who are blind or wheelchair users make up 4% of EEOC 
charges. See ADA Charge Data by Impairments/Basis—Merit Factor Resolu-
tions, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/ada-merit.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2007).  
 163. See Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 116, at 1015–17.  
 164. See Steven L. Willborn, The Nonevolution of Enforcement Under the 
ADA: Discharge Cases and the Hiring Problem, in EMPLOYMENT, DISABILITY, 
AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: ISSUES IN LAW, PUBLIC POLICY, 
AND RESEARCH 103, 103–04 (Peter David Blanck ed., 2000) (“[O]ver the short 
life of the ADA, the ratio of discharge to hiring cases has been about 10 to 1, a 
ratio that is substantially higher than for Title VII cases . . . .”). This was also 
the case for employment cases under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. See 
Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 118, at 33–34. 
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are inherently difficult to enforce.165 It is hard for applicants to 
detect discrimination and to prove they are capable of perform-
ing the job for which they applied.166 Potential plaintiffs have 
less incentive to pursue a lawsuit than existing employees,167 
and are less likely to find a lawyer even if they are so in-
clined.168 Disability is seen as individualized and incapable of 
aggregation, meaning that how an employer views one class of 
persons with disabilities may not lead them to fail to hire 
another type, which has exacerbated this trend.169 Yet this 
leaves a void of enforcement, because this is exactly where em-
ployers have the greatest incentives to discriminate.170 
This void is troubling, and needs to be filled in order to 
realize the ADA’s goal of increasing the number of people with 
disabilities in the workforce.171 What would a structural ap-
proach to litigating hiring discrimination look like? Broadly 
speaking, there are two scenarios. In the first, a formal policy 
keeps some category of people with disabilities out of the work-
force. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. was such a case.172 Plain-
tiffs, twin sisters with myopia, claimed that defendant’s policy 
requiring uncorrected vision acuity of 20/100 or better discri-
 
 165. See Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223, 
275 (2000) (“[I]t is generally quite difficult for disadvantaged workers to estab-
lish that they were unlawfully refused employment by an employer.”).  
 166. See Richard V. Burkhauser & David C. Stapleton, A Review of the 
Evidence and Its Implications for Policy Change, in DECLINE IN EMPLOYMENT, 
supra note 160, at 396. 
 167. Id. (noting how disappointed applicants decline to pursue litigation for 
reasons such as a “less[er] chance of success, a desire to focus their energy on 
searching for other jobs, fear of creating a negative reputation for themselves, 
[and] lack of support from fellow employees or employee organizations”); see 
also Willborn, supra note 164, at 115 n.2.  
 168. See Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 116, at 1003–09 (noting that 
employees with more means have an easier time securing representation than 
those with lesser means).  
 169. See Bagenstos, supra note 160, at 538. For an alternative approach 
suggesting courts should take a broader view of disability discrimination, see 
Stein & Waterstone, supra note 15, at 916–22.  
 170. Employers have at least two disincentives to hiring people with dis-
abilities: first, it increases firing costs because of potential lawsuits, and 
second, employers need to provide accommodations at their own expense for 
disabled employees. See Daron Acemoglu & Joshua D. Angrist, Consequences 
of Employment Protection? The Case of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
109 J. POL. ECON. 915, 924 (2001); Jolls, supra note 165, at 273–76. 
 171. See Bagenstos, supra note 160, at 555–56 (arguing that one hope for 
increasing the effectiveness of Title I of the ADA is strengthening enforcement 
of the antidiscrimination and accommodation requirements at the hiring 
stage). 
 172. 527 U.S. 471 (1999). 
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minated against them.173 Assuming plaintiffs meet the defini-
tion of disability,174 cases like this turn on whether the re-
quirement is job related and consistent with business necessi-
ty,175 whether the requirement protects the health or safety of 
that worker or other workers from a direct threat,176 or wheth-
er a reasonable accommodation that will enable the applicant 
to meet the standard is possible.177 These types of cases are an 
analogue to an earlier wave of Title VII litigation: what has 
been described as easier-to-identify “blanket prohibitions from 
good jobs.”178 Whether pursued under a disparate treatment or 
disparate impact theory, commentators generally view Title VII 
as removing the most egregious examples of these types of re-
strictions.179 It is less obvious that this has been the case in 
ADA litigation.180 
The second type of failure-to-hire case is more complicated. 
Here, there may be no formal (or at least apparent) policy that 
excludes people with disabilities. Hiring decisions can be made 
on the basis of even subconscious biases or discomfort with 
bringing a previously excluded and stigmatized group into the 
workforce.181 In both the Title VII and ADA contexts, this dis-
crimination has proven harder to tackle,182 although, at least in 
 
 173. Id. 
 174. In Sutton, the Court held that the plaintiffs did not meet the defini-
tion of disability. Id. at 488–89. 
 175. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (2000). 
 176. Id. § 12113(b); see also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 
86–87 (2002) (holding that an employer can refuse to hire an individual with a 
disability whom the employer reasonably believes is a threat to himself ).  
 177. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(B). 
 178. Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 116, at 1015. 
 179. Id.; see also Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: 
Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 91, 137 (2003) (“[D]isparate impact theory has proven an invalua-
ble tool for reducing employer reliance on job requirements that are unrelated 
to job performance but that stand in the way of minority progress. Without 
such a tool, employers would have been free to adopt facially neutral job re-
quirements that maintained the exclusion of blacks and minorities from vast 
areas of employment.”). 
 180. See Stein & Waterstone, supra note 15, at 861–62 (arguing that even a 
basic application of disparate impact litigation involving neutral formal poli-
cies has been lacking under the ADA).  
 181. According to Professor Susan Sturm, unconscious biases are part of a 
“second-generation” of discrimination. See Susan Sturm, Second Generation 
Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 
460 (2001).  
 182. See Bagenstos, Structural Turn, supra note 14, at 3–4 (averring that 
disparate treatment and impact models of discrimination are ill-suited to redi-
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regards to the ADA, I have previously argued that this is not 
inevitable.183 
Public enforcement authorities are the institutional actors 
that are best suited to bring both categories of these failure-to-
hire cases. Both types present greater challenges for private at-
torneys general to challenge because they are resource-
intensive, have lower probability of high damage awards, and 
plaintiffs themselves are less likely to want to pursue them. 
These disincentives, however, apply far less to public enforce-
ment authorities. Both the DOJ and EEOC can pursue cases on 
their own behalf in the public interest without finding a plain-
tiff who is ready and able to participate in long, difficult litiga-
tion,184 and have information-gathering mechanisms in place to 
identify problematic patterns and trends in the employer com-
munity.185 Government lawyers are also not beholden to the 
same financial incentives as the private bar. For these reasons, 
they are in a better position to negotiate detailed injunctive re-
lief creating forward-looking change in employment-hiring 
practices.186 The goal is to use court oversight via injunctions to 
create and enforce changes in the way employers perceive and 
react to putative employees with disabilities.  
 
stribute power and remedy unintentional discrimination); Michael Selmi, Was 
the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 738–67 (2006) 
(arguing that disparate impact theory has only proven useful in a limited un-
iverse of testing cases). 
 183. See Stein & Waterstone, supra note 15, at 902–22 (arguing that a new 
construction of group identity and an increased use of disparate impact theory 
could more readily attack structural barriers). For more optimistic views of 
Title VII’s ability to attack “structural” discrimination, see Charles A. Sulli-
van, Re-Reviving Disparate Impact, 54–67 (Seton Hall Pub. L. Res. Paper No. 
9, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=581503. 
 184. See, e.g., EEOC v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 2d 935, 937–
38 (D. Minn. 2002) (holding that when the EEOC brings a case in its own 
name pursuant to statutory authority, it may bypass the requirement of class 
certification under Rule 23, thereby obviating the need for individual inquiry). 
 185. Before filing an ADA (or Title VII) employment case, an individual 
needs to file a charge with the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2000). The 
EEOC then classifies and investigates the case. See Moss et al., supra note 73, 
at 4 (detailing EEOC investigation procedures for ADA claims). Employers 
with over one hundred employees are also required to file an “EEO-1” form 
each year with the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(c); 29 C.F.R. § 1602.7–
1602.14 (2007). These reports contain information on enforcement, self-
assessment by employers, and research.  
 186. See Michael J. Yelnosky, Filling an Enforcement Void: Using Testers 
to Uncover and Remedy Discrimination in Hiring for Lower-Skilled, Entry-
Level Jobs, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 403, 469 (1993) (“[T]he EEOC is more 
likely than a private party to obtain injunctive relief.”).  
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Regarding the first category of cases involving formal bar-
riers, there are some limited examples of public enforcement 
authorities bringing these kinds of cases. In EEOC v. North-
west Airlines, Inc., the EEOC argued that Northwest Airlines’s 
blanket policy barring anti-seizure medicated epileptics and in-
sulin-dependent diabetics from holding cleaner or equipment 
service employee positions violated the ADA.187 Although a pri-
vate litigant may have had trouble establishing class status, 
the EEOC did not.188 Similarly, in EEOC v. United Parcel Ser-
vices, Inc., the EEOC challenged a policy excluding monocular 
drivers without regard to their actual safety records and driv-
ing abilities.189 And in EEOC v. SPS Temporaries, Inc.,190 the 
Commission challenged a temporary employment agency’s hir-
ing practices regarding applicants with disabilities. But these 
cases are the exception, not the rule, in the limited pool of gov-
ernment litigation dealing with employer hiring.191 
Public enforcement authorities have no visible strategy for 
or history of bringing failure-to-hire cases that involve less 
formal policies. Although difficult, these cases need to be part 
of an effective employment enforcement scheme, as subtle bias, 
stigma, and views of people with disabilities as inauthentic 
workers run deep.192 Case development in this area necessi-
tates a robust view of disparate impact law193 and pushes the 
boundaries of tethering an employment decision to a “specific 
 
 187. 216 F. Supp. 2d 935, 935 (D. Minn. 2002). 
 188. Id. at 938.  
 189. 149 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1121–22 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
 190. EEOC v. SPS Temporaries, Inc., No. 04-CV-0052 E(SC) (W.D.N.Y. 
filed Jan. 27, 2004). This case was brought in the Western District of New 
York, and was resolved in November of 2005. See EEOC, PERFORMANCE AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FY 2006 (2006), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/ 
abouteeoc/plan/par/2006/results_objective1.html. 
 191. There are more cases that have been brought on behalf of existing 
employees. For example, see United States v. City and County of Denver, 943 
F. Supp. 1304 (D. Colo. 1996), where the DOJ brought a pattern and practice 
suit against the city and county regarding nonaccommodation of Denver police 
officers. See also Press Release, EEOC, Denny’s Sued by EEOC for Disability 
Bias Against Class of Workers Nationwide (Sept. 28, 2006) (covering an EEOC 
nation-wide suit brought on behalf of Denny’s workers for nonaccommodation 
and termination).  
 192. See Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA 
Accommodations as Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 604–08 (2004) 
(describing how people with disabilities are viewed as “inauthentic workers”).  
 193. See Stein & Waterstone, supra note 15, at 910–15 (discussing how an 
older iteration of disparate impact law could attack systemic barriers in the 
workplace). 
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employment practice,”194 a theory for which there is limited 
success under Title VII.195 The troublesome statutory provision 
governing the proof structure of Title VII disparate impact, 
however, does not technically apply to the ADA.196 Moreover, 
unlike Title VII, the EEOC is uniquely positioned to provide 
leadership under the ADA because it is responsible for promul-
gating regulations under Title I.197 The regulations that the 
EEOC has promulgated support the ADA’s inclusion of dispa-
rate impact regime,198 yet the EEOC has not pushed this posi-
tion in failure-to-hire cases.199  
One way to develop failure-to-hire cases involving informal 
policies would involve testing. Testing has been a valuable tool 
in other areas of antidiscrimination law in helping to ferret out 
difficult-to-detect discrimination.200 Primarily used by public 
interest groups, testing has been used under the Fair Housing 
Act and Title VII.201 In the employment context, testers are 
 
 194. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)–(B) (2000). The burden of proof required 
by statute demands an identification of a specific practice. See id. 
 195. Most commentators and courts, however, seem settled that intangible 
factors have trouble translating into a particular employment practice. See 
Tristin K. Green, Work Culture and Discrimination, 93 CAL. L. REV. 623, 657 
(2005) (“[C]ourts have held that an employer’s ‘passive reliance’ on relational 
means of exclusion is not subject to disparate impact attack.” (quoting EEOC 
v. Chi. Miniature Lamp Works, 947 F.2d 292, 298 (7th Cir. 1991))). There are 
examples of cases that are more receptive to these claims. In DeClue v. Central 
Illinois Light Co., 223 F.3d 434, 435 (7th Cir. 2000), the plaintiff challenged an 
employer’s failure to provide restroom facilities. Although the court failed to 
find that this constituted sexual harassment, it did suggest that “insofar as 
absence of restroom facilities deters women . . . but not men from seeking or 
holding a particular type of job . . . the absence may violate Title VII” under an 
impact theory. Id. at 436. 
 196. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)–(B) (regulating discrimination on the 
basis of basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin).  
 197. Id. § 12116. 
 198. Unlike the statute, which uses language consistent with disparate im-
pact but does not mention the term, the EEOC regulations expressly reference 
disparate impact. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(c) (2007). 
 199. This is in contrast to the DOJ’s aggressive disparate impact law de-
velopment in the early years of Title VII. See Rose, supra note 126, at 1155–
57.  
 200. See Selmi, Public vs. Private, supra note 73, at 1426 (“[T]esting has 
proved to be an effective means of documenting discrimination.”); Yelnosky, 
supra note 186, at 413 (“Testing can help to root out discriminatory practices 
where the disincentives to bring a private suit result in underenforcement.”).  
 201. See Stephen E. Haydon, Comment, A Measure of Our Progress: Testing 
for Race Discrimination in Public Accommodations, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1207, 
1216–17 (1997) (detailing the successes of testing under the Fair Housing Act); 
see also Yelsnosky, supra note 186, at 413 (“The use of testers can uncover 
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persons who apply for employment with the sole purpose of de-
tecting whether discriminatory hiring practices exist, but who 
do not intend to accept an offer of employment. The testers are 
matched to appear equally qualified for the job with respect to 
important hiring factors, including employment history and 
references.202  
Public enforcement authorities have used and supported 
testing in limited fashion. Under the Fair Housing Act, the 
government has developed a testing program that measures le-
vels of housing discrimination and properly allocates enforce-
ment efforts,203 although the bulk of the government’s testing 
efforts involve various programs to provide financing to local 
private fair housing groups.204 Under Title VII, the EEOC has 
recognized the value of testing,205 and its current position is 
that it will accept charges from testers.206 The EEOC has not 
formulated its own testing program or engaged in systematic 
efforts to promote testing programs of private groups, and there 
is a split of agreement as to whether it is statutorily entitled to 
do so.207 Although the issue has not yet come up, the EEOC 
should have greater authority to create a testing program un-
der the ADA because of the agency’s rule-making authority un-
der the statute.208 
 
employment discrimination that otherwise is unproveable because of its subtle 
form.”).  
 202. Press Release, EEOC, EEOC Issues New Guidance on Legal Standing 
of Testers (May 24, 1996), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/press/5-24-96a 
.html.  
 203. MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., 
HOUSING DISCRIMINATION STUDY 14 tbl.3.3 (1991) (showing that testing data 
collected by HUD from fair housing organizations discloses that black testers 
were falsely told that units were not available 17% of the time, and received 
less favorable treatment than white testers 39% of the time). 
 204. Selmi, Public vs. Private, supra note 73, at 1426. 
 205. See Press Release, EEOC, supra note 202 (“Testing, which was recog-
nized as a viable technique to uncover workplace bias more than 25 years ago, 
has been utilized in various quarters including public accommodations, hous-
ing, and employment.”).  
 206. EEOC Notice No. 915.002, Enforcement Guidance: Whether “Testers” 
Can File Charges and Litigate Claims of Employment Discrimination (May 22, 
1996), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/testers.html.  
 207. See Yelsnosky, supra note 186, at 459–63 (arguing that while testing 
is desirable, the EEOC presently lacks statutory authority to conduct testing); 
see also Leroy D. Clark, Employment Discrimination Testing: Theories of 
Standing and a Reply to Professor Yelnosky, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 37–46 
(1994) (arguing that employment testing is presently within the power of the 
EEOC). 
 208. 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (2000).  
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A testing program in disability cases would be a valuable 
tool in the public enforcement arsenal, both as an effective in-
novation in its own right and as a supplement to cases that pri-
vate lawyers are limited in their ability to bring.209 Although 
certain to be controversial, public testing avoids one of the most 
contested issues within testing law: whether private testers 
have individual standing to sue for various forms of relief.210 
For disability cases, testing would involve two applicants, one 
with an obvious physical disability and one without, but simi-
larly situated in terms of job qualifications. This would raise 
two sets of issues, both of which would be valuable to assess po-
tential litigation. First, are applicants receiving accommoda-
tions in the job application process?211 Second, and more impor-
tantly (or at least harder to detect), are bias and stigma 
limiting opportunities for qualified applicants with disabilities?  
Most knowledgeable observers believe they are. The 2004 
National Organization on Disability/Harris Survey of Ameri-
cans with Disabilities found that, as in previous years, the most 
prevalent form of discrimination against people with disabili-
ties in employment is not being offered a job for which one is 
qualified.212 The second most common is being refused a job in-
terview on the basis of a disability.213 The State Bar of Califor-
nia’s Committee on Legal Professionals with Disabilities re-
ported that nearly half of the respondents it surveyed believed 
that they were denied employment opportunities because of 
their disabilities.214 More anecdotally, in May 2006, the Ameri-
can Bar Association Commission on Mental and Physical Disa-
bility convened the first National Conference on the Employ-
 
 209. See Yelnsoky, supra note 186, at 429–55 (noting the obstacles private 
individuals and groups face in testing on their own). 
 210. See generally Michael E. Rosman, Standing Alone: Standing Under 
the Fair Housing Act, 60 MO. L. REV. 547 (1995) (discussing the inconsistent 
fair housing standing decisions by the lower courts). 
 211. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4)–(7) (2000) (requiring reasonable accom-
modation in the job application process). 
 212. See NAT ’L ORG. ON DISABILITY, 2004 N.O.D./HARRIS SURVEY OF 
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES 31, 39 (2004). 
 213. Together, these two variants of discrimination account for 51% of job-
related discrimination against people with disabilities. Id. at 39. 
 214. ABA COMM’N ON MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY, THE NATIONAL 
CONFERENCE ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF LAWYERS WITH DISABILITIES: A REPORT 
FROM THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION FOR THE LEGAL PROFESSION 10–11 
(2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/disability/docs/conf_report_final. 
pdf. Many respondents also believed that they were denied jobs even though 
they graduated in the top ten to twenty percent of their law school classes at 
higher ranked schools than those that received job offers. Id. at 11. 
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ment of Lawyers with Disabilities.215 This meeting and subse-
quent report documented the existence of negative stereotypes 
about lawyers with disabilities in the legal profession. Many 
accounts were presented about qualified lawyers with disabili-
ties who were clearly precluded from legal opportunities when 
interviewers realized they had disabilities.216 A testing pro-
gram is invaluable to detect and craft a litigation response to 
these types of violations. 
2. Physical Access Cases for Privately Owned Places of Public 
Accommodation 
The ADA is unique amongst antidiscrimination statutes in 
that it seeks to restructure the actual physical environment of 
places of public accommodation. Although previous antidiscri-
mination laws like Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 re-
quired nondiscrimination in access to public places, the 
changes required to the physical environment were limited. 
With disabilities, however, discrimination appears to have been 
built into the environment. Steps can be just as effective in 
keeping someone with a wheelchair out of a building as a dis-
criminatory policy is for a racial minority. To create access in 
privately owned places of public accommodation, Title III of the 
ADA requires that newly constructed or renovated facilities 
must be fully accessible,217 and that structures that were built 
before the ADA’s enactment must be made accessible where 
doing so is “readily achievable.”218 The requirements are simi-
lar for public buildings under Title II.219 
 
 215. See id. In the interests of full disclosure, I am a Commissioner of the 
ABA Commission on Mental and Physical Disability Law.  
 216. See id.; see also Ellen Simon, Job Hunt a Challenge for Disabled: Em-
ployers Wary Despite Applicants’ Qualifications, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 10, 2006, available at http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/ 
business/266073_disabilities10.html. 
 217. 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a) (2000). 
 218. Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). 
 219. The regulations interpreting Title II of the ADA provide that regard-
ing existing facilities, “each service, program, or activity [conducted by a pub-
lic entity] . . . when viewed in its entirety, [must be] readily accessible to and 
useable by individuals with disabilities.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a) (2007). This 
does not mean that each existing facility must be physically accessible to and 
useable by individuals with disabilities. See id. § 35.105(a)(1). The section of 
the regulations dealing with new or modified facilities provides that “[e]ach 
facility or part of a facility constructed by, on behalf of, or for the use of a pub-
lic entity shall be designed and constructed in such manner that the facility or 
part of the facility is readily accessible to and usable by individuals with dis-
abilities . . . .” See id. § 35.151(a).  
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Although there are no long-term systemic studies to date, 
media reports, testimony from advocates across the country, 
and other accounts have shown that widespread inaccessibility 
of physical structures in private and public facilities remains a 
rampant problem, even in cases where barrier removal would 
not be difficult.220 Especially regarding privately owned places 
of public accommodation, this represents a failure of the ADA’s 
remedial scheme and reliance on private enforcement. Individ-
ual litigants can only receive injunctive relief under Title III, 
and their lawyers’ only hope of receiving payment for these cas-
es comes from recovering attorneys’ fees, an enterprise that has 
become more uncertain after the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Buckhannon.221 A recent essay by Professor Samuel Bagenstos 
discusses the paradoxical situation created by a broad statute 
with limited remedies.222 Professor Bagenstos notes the media 
and political attack on serial litigation, which he characterizes 
as an inevitable (though undesirable) consequence of importing 
the private attorney general profit motive into civil rights liti-
gation.223 
There is an enforcement void here that the government is 
best suited to fill. ADA access cases against privately owned 
places of accommodations are inherently unattractive for the 
private bar to bring. In addition to the lack of damage remedy 
and difficulty obtaining attorneys fees, standing is difficult to 
 
 220. See Bagenstos, supra note 19, at 3; see also ADA Notification Act: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Ju-
diciary, 106th Cong. 49 (2000) (statement of Rick A. Shotz, ADA Consulting 
Assocs.) (“[P]robably less than one building in 10 that is a public accommoda-
tion is compliant with the ADA.”). For an example of ADA compliance prob-
lems, see Dan Weikel, Getting There Is None of the Fun, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 13, 
2006, at B1 (discussing a lack of sidewalk and public right-of-way access in 
Riverside, California).  
 221. 532 U.S. 598 (2001); see Albiston & Nielson, supra note 19, at 1089. 
Regarding public buildings, the scenario under Title II is not much better. 
Plaintiffs can only receive damages for cases involving “deliberate indiffer-
ence.” Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1138 (9th Cir. 2001). A pri-
vate plaintiff ’s ability to sue for damages is also curtailed by the Court’s deci-
sions in Garrett and Lane. See Waterstone, supra note 64, at 795, 833–34. 
 222. See Bagenstos, supra note 19, at 3. 
 223. Id. at 25–30. On the additional backlash against ADA access suits, see 
R. Scott Moxley, The New Crips; An Ex-Drug Dealer and Burglar Leads a 
Wheelchair Posse Terrorizing Southern California Businesses. Would You Be-
lieve He Has the Law on His Side?, OC WEEKLY, Oct. 12, 2006. For additional 
negative media portrayals of ADA litigation, see Linda Hamilton Krieger,  
Foreword—Backlash Against the ADA: Interdisciplinary Perspectives and Im-
plications for Social Justice Strategies, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 9–11 
(2000). 
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establish. A plaintiff must meet the continuing violation doc-
trine, meaning that she must show that there is a risk of the 
harm happening to her again.224 A plaintiff ’s standing is also 
tied to his or her disability, meaning that a wheelchair user 
suing a stadium can only obtain an injunction with respect to 
the parts of the stadium in which he encountered difficulty and 
cannot seek relief for individuals with vision impairments.225 
Again, the government can avoid most of these structural 
limitations. Under Title III of the ADA, the government’s en-
forcement powers are substantially broader than private liti-
gants. The attorney general can initiate complaints and com-
mence a civil action if it believes that any person or group of 
persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination, or 
any person or group of persons has been discriminated against 
and such discrimination raises an issue of general public im-
portance.226 By suing in the public interest, the government’s 
standing is not tied to any particular plaintiff or his or her dis-
ability.227 Unlike private individuals, the government can seek 
compensatory damages,228 and can seek civil penalties (up to 
$100,000 for multiple violations) in cases it deems important to 
“vindicate the public interest.”229 
Primarily, however, government enforcement can and 
should get its power from its unique ability to pursue structural 
injunctive relief. The attorney general can bring cases solely fo-
cused on invoking the courts’ injunctive powers to enforce and 
monitor physical accessibility standards. Unlike private indi-
viduals, the government does not have to be overly concerned 
about financing cases through attorneys’ fees and damage 
 
 224. Deck v. Am. Haw. Cruises, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 1297 (D. Haw. 
2000) (“[T]he plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury in fact’—an invasion of a 
legal protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized; and (b) ‘actual 
or imminent’, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’” (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992))).  
 225. Parr v. L&L Drive-Inn Rest., 96 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1082–83 (D. Haw. 
2000) (denying plaintiff ’s standing to sue for barriers that do not affect plain-
tiff ’s specific disability). 
 226. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b)(1)(B) (2000). 
 227. See Mary Crossley, Becoming Visible: The ADA’s Impact on Health 
Care for Persons with Disabilities, 52 ALA. L. REV. 51, 63 (2000) (asserting that 
actions brought by the DOJ or a United States Attorney are important be-
cause they “take the focus away from the harm threatened to a particular in-
dividual with a disability and can provide an effective mechanism for compel-
ling a health care provider to conform its practices more broadly to the ADA’s 
auxiliary aids requirements”).  
 228. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b)(2)(B). 
 229. Id. § 12188(b)(2)(C). 
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awards. They can also bring broad cases challenging all facets 
of inaccessibility in public places, rather than being tied to inef-
ficient piecemeal litigation on behalf of individual or discrete 
classes of plaintiffs.230 
Yet across administrations, the attorney general’s office 
has not pursued this agenda.231 Examining the Title III case 
law for cases that the DOJ brought under their “general public 
importance” and “pattern or practice” authority that involve 
new construction232 shows that the DOJ’s cases have almost all 
involved movie theater or sports stadium lines-of-access.233 
While sparse in scope and number,234 these cases do show the 
potential of this type of litigation strategy. In United States v. 
AMC Entertainment, Inc., the DOJ secured a court order that 
required compliance with ADA access codes in AMC stadium-
style theaters across the country.235 The court kept jurisdiction 
of the action for five years to enforce the injunction.236 What is 
needed is more structural cases like this that create an in-
depth look at inaccessible conditions for broad categories of 
people with disabilities.  
These guidelines for when public enforcement officials 
should devote resources to bringing structural litigation to sup-
plement private enforcement—cases where the profit motive for 
plaintiffs and private attorneys is low (because of a lack of 
 
 230. In a Title VII case in the pre-Falcon era, one court commented on this 
principle. See McLendon v. M. David Lowe Pers. Servs., Inc., No. 75-H-1185, 
1977 WL 15, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 29, 1977) (“[T]his Court must reject the the-
sis that a named plaintiff must have been the victim of . . . discrimination . . . 
manifested by an employer. To hold otherwise would be to burden the Courts 
with a multiplicity of suits . . . . This would be plainly an inefficient method of 
implementing . . . Title VII.”). 
 231. See Bagenstos, supra note 19, at 35; see also Milani, supra note 74, at 
112–13. 
 232. 42 U.S.C. § 12183 (2000).  
 233. The fact that these cases have been consistently brought since the ear-
lier years after the ADA’s passage demonstrates the Department’s path de-
pendent behavior. See, e.g., United States v. Cinemark U.S.A., 348 F.3d 569, 
572 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that the regulation requiring wheelchair accessi-
bility for public assembly areas meant that theater owners must provide simi-
lar viewing angles for all patrons); United States v. Ellerbe Becket, Inc., 976 F. 
Supp. 1262, 1268–69 (D. Minn. 1997) (holding an architectural firm in viola-
tion of the DOJ regulation involving sight lines for sports facilities).  
 234. For a reading, analysis, and codification of every Title III ADA case at 
the court of appeals level from 1990–2004, see generally Waterstone, supra 
note 61 (examining all eighty-two appellate cases brought under Title III).  
 235. United States v. AMC Entm’t, Inc., No. CV-99-01034-FMC(SHX), 2006 
WL 224178, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan 10, 2006).  
 236. Id. 
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damage remedy, limitations on attorneys’ fees recovery), non-
compliance appears to be systemic, there is an absence of case 
development, and individual plaintiffs will have standing diffi-
culties challenging various forms of discrimination—certainly 
also apply to other areas of disability law.237 In the broader un-
iverse of civil rights laws, there is also the potential for a struc-
tural approach by public enforcement officials to create mea-
ningful change.238 
 
 237. One area of disability law involves the provisions of the Fair Housing 
Amendments Act that require all new multifamily housing be designed and 
constructed with six specified accessibility features. 42 U.S.C.  
§ 3604(f )(3)(C) (2000). Professor Robert Schwemm notes widespread noncom-
pliance with this statutory provision, and discusses the lack of cases despite 
their potential for success. Robert G. Schwemm, Barriers to Accessible Hous-
ing: Enforcement Issues in ‘Design and Construction’ Cases Under the Fair 
Housing Act, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 753, 768–74 (2006). The advantages the DOJ 
receives from bringing these cases are significant. For example, in cases 
brought by the Department, the courts have taken a relaxed view of the “con-
tinuing violation” doctrine. Id. at 845. Another area where this type of vigor-
ous enforcement is at least as important is under the provisions of the Help 
America Vote Act (HAVA) requiring that voting systems shall “be accessible 
for individuals with disabilities, including nonvisual accessibility for the blind 
and visually impaired, in a manner that provides the same opportunity for 
access and participation (including privacy and independence) as for other 
voters.” 42 U.S.C. § 15481(a)(3)(A) (Supp. III 2005). Here, public enforcement 
is crucial, because the only grievance option available to private citizens is an 
administrative proceeding. Id. U.S.C. § 15512. The DOJ has taken the position 
that individuals do not have a private right of action to enforce this part of 
HAVA. See Federal Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff ’s Motion for Prelimi-
nary Injunction at 3, Taylor v. Onorato, 428 F. Supp. 2d 384 (W.D. Pa. 2006) 
(No. 06-481) (arguing that HAVA confers no private right of action); see also 
Taylor v. Onorato, 428 F. Supp. 2d 384, 345 (W.D. Pa. 2006) (holding that pri-
vate plaintiffs have no private right of action under HAVA access provisions). 
The DOJ does have the ability under HAVA to bring “a civil action against any 
State or jurisdiction in an appropriate United States District Court for such 
declaratory and injunctive relief . . . as may be necessary.” 42 U.S.C. § 15511 
(Supp. III 2005). So far, however, despite early evidence of noncompliance, the 
Department has brought only two cases relating to the disability provisions of 
HAVA. See United States v. Maine, No. 06-86-B-W, 2007 WL 1059565 (D. Me. 
Apr. 4, 2007); Complaint, United States v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, No. 06-
CV-0263 (GLS) (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2006), available at www.usdoj.gov/crt/ 
voting/hava/ny_hava.htm. 
 238. Some of the nondisability provisions of the HAVA, for example, fit this 
description, though the ability of a private plaintiff to bring a lawsuit chal-
lenging her ability to cast a provisional ballot is unclear, as the statute itself 
provides no private right of action. See 42 U.S.C. § 15482 (Supp. III 2005) 
(provisional ballot provision); cf. Sandusky County Democratic Party v. 
Blackwell, 339 F. Supp. 2d 975, 975 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (holding that an individ-
ual has standing to sue under this provision pursuant to § 1983). Standing is 
traditionally difficult to establish in voting cases, and HAVA’s provisional bal-
lot provisions have been criticized for being unclear. See Rick L. Hasen, If It Is 
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III.  NEW GOVERNANCE   
Litigation, or the threat of litigation, is a means to an 
end—narrowing the gap between what laws formally state 
should happen and what actually does happen. As set forth 
above, public enforcement officials should engage in a structur-
al litigation campaign to help increase ADA compliance. But 
the reality is that enforcement agents—whether public or pri-
vate—will never be able to bring every even potentially merito-
rious case. To a certain extent, an enforcement gap will proba-
bly always exist. For those that tend to take a litigation-centric 
view of civil rights in general and enforcement in particular,239 
there is a relatively new but expanding body of scholarship that 
may ultimately challenge the assumption that litigation is the 
enforcement apparatus of choice.240 Loosely referred to in the 
literature as “new governance,” this scholarship moves away 
 
Broke, Fix It. Now, RECORDER (S.F.), Nov. 4, 2004, available at http://www 
.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=1099217144168; Daniel Tokaji, 
The 2008 Election: Could It Be a Repeat of 2000?, FINDLAW WRIT, Nov. 30, 
2004, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20041130_tokaji.html. Simi-
larly, victims of housing discrimination often may not realize they have been 
treated unfairly, or even if so, may not want to sue, paralleling the problem of 
victims of employment discrimination who have not been hired. Schwemm, 
supra note 14, at 380. Development of disparate impact law has also been slow 
and uneven. See James A. Kushner, An Unfinished Agenda: The Federal Fair 
Housing Enforcement Effort, 6 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 348, 356 (1988); see also 
BROOKS ET AL., supra note 3, at 311 (noting that the Supreme Court has not 
yet decided disparate impact case under the Fair Housing Act). A commitment 
to public systemic litigation in these areas will help these statutes achieve 
their respective goals of a fairer voting system and eliminate discrimination in 
the housing market.  
 239. I include myself in this category. See Waterstone, supra note 61, at 
1826–32 (looking at respective rates of litigation across the Titles of the ADA). 
 240. This coincides with an alternative strain of scholarship that urges a 
move outside of the traditional legal process altogether to vindicate civil 
rights. For example, Professors Kevin Johnson and Bill Hing have recently 
written about a new immigrants’ civil rights struggle. See Bill Ong Hing & 
Kevin R. Johnson, The Immigrant Rights Marches of 2006 and the Prospects 
for a New Civil Rights Movement, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=951268. They suggest that with an 
uncertain Congress and a judiciary unlikely to support social change, immi-
grant groups should focus their current efforts on building broad political coa-
litions with other groups. Id. (manuscript at 42–43, 47, 67–79). Professor Orly 
Lobel also recently wrote on perceived limited successes of various civil rights 
movements and the subsequent shift away from traditional legal reform to-
ward community organizing and grassroots campaigning. Orly Lobel, The Par-
adox of Extra-Legal Activism: Critical Legal Consciousness and Transforma-
tive Politics, 120 HARV. L. REV. 937, 971–87 (2007). This is a view that Lobel 
ultimately rejects. Id. 
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from traditional modes of enforcement and regulation.241 In-
stead, it focuses on collaborative, multiparty, multilevel, adap-
tive, problem-solving methods of public policy implementation 
that to varying extents supplement or supplant traditional reg-
ulation.  
After briefly explaining the basics of new governance for 
the uninitiated, this Part discusses a potential fit between dis-
ability policy as set forth in the ADA and enforcement options 
that seek to shift the locus of control from courts to networks of 
interested parties. Although with new governance the line be-
tween public and private actors becomes more blurry and less 
important,242 I will focus primarily on the role public enforce-
ment officials have to play in the constellation of new gover-
nance activities. In many ways, public officials have lagged be-
hind private actors in the development of creative enforcement 
mechanisms, despite many institutional advantages.243 Al-
though the choice to focus on public enforcement is somewhat 
limiting, I believe that it is defensible. As set forth above, pub-
 
 241. Karkkainen, supra note 12, at 471–78 (explaining that “New Gover-
nance” is a new type of legal scholarship that is of growing importance); see 
also Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Go-
vernance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004) (identi-
fying, discussing, and linking governance scholarship); cf. Joel Handler et al., 
A Roundtable on New Legal Realism, Microanalysis of Institutions, and the 
New Governance: Exploring Convergences and Differences, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 
479, 492–98 (stating that new legal theory must develop to fulfill new social 
demands and discussing the possible impact of the paradigm shift).  
 242. See Lobel, supra note 241, at 373 (describing the Renew Deal gover-
nance as engaging many actors while giving citizens active roles). 
 243. Innovation certainly occurs on the private side, even operating loosely 
within the framework of traditional litigation. The law firm of Goldstein, 
Demchak, Baller, Borgen & Dardarian, and solo practitioner Lainey Feingold, 
have developed a method known as structured negotiations. They describe this 
method as an alternative to litigation that emphasizes “collaboration, relation-
ship-building, solution, and disability community empowerment.” See E-mail 
from Lainey Feingold to ADRC Listserve (Jan. 3, 2007) (on file with author). 
Structured negotiations aided in successfully negotiating legal agreements on 
issues including Talking ATMs, accessible websites, tactile point of sale devic-
es, and alternative format systems with various national companies. See The 
International Center for Disability Resources on the Internet, News on Talk-
ing ATMs and Other News Dealing with Banks, Retail Locations, and Finan-
cial Institutions, http://www.icdri.org/AssistiveTechnology/ATMs/news_on_ 
talking_atms.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2007) (listing companies such as Wal-
Mart, Bank of America, RadioShack, Safeway, Citibank, and Wells Fargo); see 
also Tim Hay, Negotiating Wins for the Disabled, DAILY JOURNAL (L.A.), June 
21, 2007, at 3 (describing efforts of lawyers Lainey Feingold and Linda Darda-
rian to get corporations and local governments to improve accommodations for 
the blind).  
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lic enforcement authorities have both the constitutional 
mandate and statutory obligation to vindicate civil rights. They 
should seek to do so in the most effective way possible, whether 
this involves litigation or other, less conventional methods. Be-
low, I will demonstrate that as a practical matter, public en-
forcement authorities are well suited as a matter of presence 
and resources to play a strong role in new governance-type en-
forcement options. 
Although this is a first step in applying new governance 
theory to civil rights law (and not an exhaustive treatment on 
the subject), I make some initial observations about its worth in 
the disability arena. In particular, I highlight two areas cov-
ered by the ADA where public enforcement authorities could 
actually take steps to decentralize ADA norm elaboration but 
potentially improve compliance.244 
A. FORM AND STRENGTH OF NEW GOVERNANCE 
In the fields of labor law and environmental law, amongst 
others, commentators have challenged the traditional modes of 
enforcement and regulation, advocating a diversification of the 
ways that enforcement officials interact with regulated enti-
ties.245 Sometimes (though not uniformly) referred to as new 
governance,246 this body of work challenges the predominance 
 
 244. “Norm” is used here the same way Professor Susan Sturm uses it; that 
is, moving from a general legal statement to a more specific one in which the 
law is translated into concrete change. Sturm, supra note 181, at 522 (“The 
structural approach to second generation problems calls for a dynamic and re-
ciprocal relationship between judicially elaborated general legal norms and 
workplace-generated problem-solving approaches, which in turn elaborate and 
transform the understanding of the general norm.”).  
 245. See Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative 
State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 6–7 (1997) (describing the promise of multistake-
holder negotiation in the context of environmental law); James S. Liebman & 
Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined: The Emerging 
Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 183, 229–31, 271 (2003) (explaining a new activist movement within 
school reform); Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 
1227, 1231–32 (1995) (discussing an alternative method of environmental reg-
ulation). Without using the new governance label, Professor Susan Sturm ap-
plies many of the concepts associated with new governance theory to sex-based 
employment discrimination. See Sturm, supra note 181, at 461–63 (addressing 
increased participation by private actors, “internal problem-solving” within 
the workplace, and greater tailoring of regulation). To date, however, these 
principles have not been applied to disability law.  
 246. See Karkkainen, supra note 12, at 472 (using the term “New Gover-
nance”); Lobel, supra note 241, at 344 (using term “governance” while address-
ing the new governance model). 
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of “traditional” regulation, whereby certain enumerated prac-
tices are directly prohibited and a centralized enforcement 
agency implements and enforces the law, usually through ad-
versarial litigation by that entity or by private actors.247 The 
goal of new governance theory is to get a broad range of stake-
holders involved, including regulated entities, private interest 
groups, government enforcement agencies, and the class of 
people that the law is intended to benefit. Ideally, these various 
groups converge on a set of legal norms, and then utilize their 
collective energy in achieving effective and context-specific so-
lutions. 
New governance advocates believe this approach has sev-
eral strengths. Litigation is adversarial, and any process with 
less focus on assigning blame is more likely to arrive at a mu-
tually satisfying agreement. This can be particularly effective if 
the range of stakeholders—the regulated entities, enforcement 
officials, and the law’s beneficiaries—are all involved in dis-
cussing solutions.248 New governance’s premium on information 
sharing allows reforms and compliance schemes that work well 
for one actor to be passed on to other interested parties.249 In 
this way, a broader audience is reached and impacted than 
might be possible in litigation, and a continuous cycle of learn-
ing is created. Public enforcement officials, as well as private 
actors, can facilitate this process.250 Finally, the norm elabora-
tion and refinement that occurs by multiparty nonadversarial 
talks can create behavior that pushes the bounds of what the 
law might otherwise more formally require.251  
 
 247. In the literature, this is referred to as top down “hierarchy and con-
trol” regulation. See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 241, at 344 (stating that the new 
governance model embodies greater participation and collaboration than the 
New Deal’s hierarchical system). 
 248. WILLIAM A. SHUTKIN, THE LAND THAT COULD BE: ENVIRONMENTAL-
ISM AND DEMOCRACY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 14–15 (2000); see also 
Lobel, supra note 241, at 374 (describing an increase in public and private sec-
tor interdependence).  
 249. See DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: 
HOW THE ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
232–34 (1992) (examining strategic planning that involves studying a compa-
ny’s current situation and goals, developing a way to achieve those goals, and 
then measuring the result); see also Lobel, supra note 241, at 380–81 (stating 
that the new governance model creates incentives to share information to ena-
ble the comparison of various success levels of methods in similar situations).  
 250. See Sturm, supra note 181, at 512–14 (information tracking by private 
entities); see also Lobel, supra note 241, at 422–23 (information gathering by 
public officials). 
 251. This is the thrust of Professor Sturm’s argument within employment 
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Professor Orly Lobel’s recent work on workplace safety 
regulation by the Occupational Safety Health Administration 
(OSHA) illustrates new governance principles, with an empha-
sis on the role played by public enforcement officials.252 OSHA 
is responsible for promulgating regulations for workplace safety 
and for monitoring workplace compliance, primarily through 
inspections. Yet OSHA has traditionally underenforced its reg-
ulations; and to the extent that OSHA enforced its regulations 
through the traditional adversarial model, these efforts were 
criticized for punishing good faith efforts to move beyond com-
pliance, and for diminishing the willingness of regulated enti-
ties to cooperate and learn.253 This was partly symptomatic of 
the fact that OSHA’s one-size-fits-all rules did not fit all firms, 
especially in an era of fast production, small firms, and complex 
chains of authority.254 Professor Lobel presents recent OSHA 
initiatives as showing the potential successes of a new gover-
nance approach. These initiatives include incentives that offer 
a decreased chance of inspection for firms that were below the 
industry injury rate; OSHA partnerships with certain indus-
tries that allowed information sharing and steps to eliminate 
specific risks; and an increased emphasis on training and out-
reach programs.255 The existing, although incomplete, evidence 
reviewing these programs suggests that they have been suc-
cessful. The Government Accounting Office concluded that the 
new cooperative strategies have improved safety and health 
practices, and allowed OSHA to play a “collaborative, rather 
than a policing, role with employers.”256 Similarly, OSHA re-
ports show a decrease in workplace injuries for firms partici-
 
discrimination law; courts, workplaces, employees, lawyers, and mediating or-
ganizations can work together to tackle “second-generation” discrimination in 
a way that courts have not under the operative legal framework of Title VII. 
See generally Sturm, supra note 181, at 461–63, 567–68.  
 252. See Orly Lobel, Interlocking Regulatory and Industrial Relations: The 
Governance of Workplace Safety, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 1071, 1073 (2005) (“[Go-
vernance encompasses] a range of innovative policy approaches, integrates co-
operation into the core of regulatory relations and sensibly combines both 
choice and sanction . . . through a formalized structured legal framework.”).  
 253. Id. at 1088–90. 
 254. Id. at 1093–95. 
 255. Id. at 1104–08. 
 256. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WORKPLACE SAFETY AND HEALTH: 
OSHA’S VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE STRATEGIES SHOW PROMISING RESULTS, 
BUT SHOULD BE FULLY EVALUATED BEFORE THEY ARE EXPANDED 43 (2004), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04378.pdf; see also Lobel, supra 
note 252, at 1108. 
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pating in these programs,257 and interviews with participating 
workplaces describe increased trust and better relationships 
with OSHA officials.258 
New governance is not without its downside. There is a 
risk of co-option or exit, whereby the entities being regulated 
either opt out of the scheme entirely or are able to so influence 
the process that reforms become pretextual.259 Secondly, there 
is the problem of voice, which involves making sure that the 
beneficiaries of regulation sufficiently and meaningfully partic-
ipate in the norms and rules that will impact them.260 Finally, 
new governance’s reliance on soft law and actual track records 
in creating reform have been questioned,261 although the great 
weight of new governance scholarship recognizes the value of 
traditional enforcement and regulation to complement “soft 
law” approaches.262 Cognizant of these strengths and weak-
nesses, I now turn to explaining how new governance concepts 
have been and could be effectively imported into disability law. 
B. CONCEPTUAL FIT OF THE ADA WITH NEW GOVERNANCE 
In thinking about new governance and disability law, one 
is confronted with some initial choices. Some new governance 
thinking involves social situations that occur at a different 
point in time or space than the current state of disability law—
 
 257. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP ’T OF LABOR, WORKPLACE 
INJURIES AND ILLNESSES IN 2005 (2006). 
 258. Lobel, supra note 252, at 1109–10.  
 259. See Green, supra note 195, at 675 (2005) (describing co-option as a po-
tential drawback of employer self-regulation); see also Lobel, supra note 252, 
at 1075–76 (asking if the state will return as regulator if public-private part-
nerships are ineffective). 
 260. Lobel, supra note 252, at 1076. 
 261. See Karkkainen, supra note 12, at 476–77 (“[B]y all accounts[,] the ac-
tual transition of new governance approaches to public problem solving thus 
far has been spotty. Innovations occur here and there, discernible within a 
number of disparate policy domains but dominant in few, and the outcomes of 
these scattered policy experiments remain ambiguous and contested. Even the 
most successful experiments have yet to be replicated widely, leaving them 
vulnerable to skeptics’ charge that their success depends upon factors unique 
to their own time, place, and fortuitous circumstances.” (citations omitted)); 
see also Jacqueline Savitz, Compensating Citizens, in BEYOND BACKYARD 
ENVIRONMENTALISM 65–69 (Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers eds., 2000) (criticiz-
ing the softness of new governance); Bagenstos, Structural Turn, supra note 
14, at 27–34.  
 262. See Karkkainen, supra note 12, at 486 (“[M]ost New Governance scho-
lars acknowledge the necessity for some or many forms of ‘hardness’ in law, 
and would deviate from that, if at all, only by admitting ‘softness’ in one or a 
few aspects of the legal regime they envision.”). 
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for example, without a formal comprehensive statute.263 In this 
Article, I do not attempt to speculate as to what a world with-
out the ADA might look like in terms of disability policy and 
regulation, although that would be an interesting thought exer-
cise.  
As a consequence of this choice, my primary focus will be 
on governance options that, while working within the general 
structure of the ADA, create opportunities to localize, decen-
tralize, and increase the number of stakeholders who have a 
say in how regulated entities comply with the law. This does 
not diminish or eliminate the need for ADA litigation, although 
ADA cases may lose their role as the primary procedural ve-
hicle for establishing and vindicating positive rights. Rather, I 
will highlight enforcement options that make the courts less of 
a vehicle to define rights, and instead provide the enforcement 
apparatus and backbone to more narrowly tailored and context-
specific solutions.264  
The legal and policy frameworks of the ADA are amenable 
to such an approach. From a textual perspective, the ADA es-
sentially prohibits behavior by certain regulated entities that 
“discriminates” on the basis of disability. This prohibition 
comes in varying degrees of specificity, but there is enough in-
terpretative and regulatory space to generate a fruitful discus-
sion of nonlitigation enforcement alternatives.265 For example, 
the ADA’s central command prevents discrimination on the ba-
 
 263. See Lobel, supra note 242, at 436–38 (describing how new governance 
principles underlie the legal rules for the internal Internet standard setting).  
 264. Other scholars use the litigation system to shift the locus of control 
from courts more directly to stakeholders. Professors Charles Sabel and Wil-
liam Simon, for example, suggest that while structural litigation traditionally 
focused on “command and control” type consent decrees, the movement is to-
ward “decrees” that emphasize broad “goals and methods of monitoring 
achievement.” Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: 
How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1025–26 (2004); 
see also Green, supra note 195, at 678–83 (suggesting, alternatively, doctrinal 
and administrative options going beyond legal rights to combat work culture 
discrimination). 
 265. For example, to the extent that the ADA was merely a laundry list of 
very specific physical modifications that certain classes of regulated parties 
had to make, any discussion of how new governance might enforce—as op-
posed to create—those rules would be somewhat stilted. Either entities comply 
or face lawsuits by private or public forces seeking to make them perform re-
quired statutory changes. Generally speaking, however, the ADA is not this 
binary. See infra notes 266–72 and accompanying text. 
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sis of disability.266 Within the statute, however, there is flexibil-
ity in executing this role. For example, even within employ-
ment law (which is one of the most detailed parts of the sta-
tute), an employer must reasonably accommodate a qualified 
employee with a disability.267 How an employer internally 
manages that process, however, is largely left up to that em-
ployer. To a significant extent, employers and employees must 
discern for themselves what constitutes a “reasonable accom-
modation,” or invoke the power of the courts to decide the issue 
for them.268 Similarly, while public entities must meet the pro-
gram access standard, meaning that programs, services, and 
activities must be accessible when viewed in their entirety,269 it 
is largely up to the public entity to determine how to do so.270 
Finally, under Title III of the ADA, all new construction must 
conform to the United States Access Board’s ADA Accessibility 
Guidelines.271 But these guidelines contain a provision allowing 
departure from the technical requirements “where the alterna-
tive designs and technologies used will provide substantially 
equivalent or greater access to and usability of the facility.”272 
All of this creates the opportunity for more flexible, context-
specific solutions that can be arrived at through collaborative 
 
 266. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000) (“No covered entity shall discriminate 
against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such 
individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or 
discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, 
conditions, and privileges of employment.”); see also id. § 12132 (“Subject to 
the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual with a disability 
shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be de-
nied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be 
subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”); id. § 12182 (“No individual 
shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal 
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accom-
modations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, 
leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.”).  
 267. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A). 
 268. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2) (2007) (suggesting that “reasonable ac-
commodation may include” altering facilities so that they may be used, chang-
ing job opportunities, and engaging the employee to determine his or her limi-
tations). Even the employer’s “interactive process” engagement with the 
employee is a creation of administrative regulation. Id. 
 269. 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a) (2007).  
 270. Id. § 35.105 (requiring every public entity to complete a self-
evaluation of their services, programs, and practices, and develop a transition 
plan to make any necessary modifications).  
 271. See 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(1) (2000); see also 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. A, § 
4.1.3 (2007) (“Accessible Buildings: New Construction”). 
 272. 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. A, § 2.2 (2007) (“Equivalent Facilitation”).  
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problem solving, even within the context of traditional litiga-
tion. 
There are additional reasons that disability law would be 
supported by a move away from courts and lawsuits. In all of 
its forms, litigation under antidiscrimination law is primarily a 
search for blameworthy actors.273 Yet the ADA, perhaps to a 
unique extent in antidiscrimination law, can be seen as incor-
porating a vision of distributive justice.274 In all of its titles, the 
ADA assigns costs to public and private actors who may harbor 
no animus toward people with disabilities. The cost of accom-
modating these individuals and creating access where before 
there was none is statutorily designed to be borne by a broad 
range of actors, including private employers, owners of private-
ly owned places of public accommodation, or individual state 
and local governments. Forms of regulation that focus less on 
blame may be better suited to distributive goals than litiga-
tion.275  
Finally, many of the criticisms of traditional “command 
and control” top-down regulation apply to ADA enforcement. In 
other fields, new governance scholars have criticized public 
regulation as creating both over- and underregulation and en-
forcement.276 The problem of ADA underenforcement has been 
discussed above: there is very little real risk of employers or 
businesses being sued for violating the ADA, and even less of a 
chance such a lawsuit would be brought by a public enforce-
ment official.277 Yet there is also at least perceived overen-
 
 273. See Julie Chi-Hye Suk, Antidiscrimination Law in the Administrative 
State, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 405, 420–23 (stating that blameworthiness is in-
cluded as an element in the Supreme Court’s finding of discrimination). 
 274. Id. at 426–27. Although Professor Suk only discusses reasonable ac-
commodation under Title I of the ADA, the basic concept can and should be 
applied to the ADA more globally. All three of the ADA’s titles move beyond 
traditional conceptions of “equal treatment” and include reasonable accommo-
dations requirements. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2007) (reasonable modifi-
cation under Title II); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2000) (reasonable 
modification under Title III).  
 275. See Suk, supra note 273, at 473 (arguing that administrative regula-
tion is better suited to distributive goals than litigation because it can be more 
nuanced and is less focused on traditional concepts of blameworthiness of in-
dividual actors). 
 276. See Lobel, supra note 252, at 1086–92 (arguing that OSHA’s regulato-
ry and enforcement causes practice under regulation and enforcement).  
 277. In 2006, for example, the EEOC received 15,575 disability charges. 
See EEOC, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990 (ADA) CHARGES FY 
1997–FY 2006, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/ada-charges.html (last visited Nov. 5, 
2007). They litigated forty-two ADA cases in 2006. See EEOC, EEOC Litiga-
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forcement, evidenced by the business community’s complaints 
about overly technical and difficult-to-understand architectural 
requirements.278 New governance theorists also criticize the 
traditional regulatory model as bogged down in ossified regula-
tions and unresponsive to fast-moving market realities.279 
Within disability law, Title I of the ADA has been criticized for 
having limited success in attacking “second-generation” sub-
conscious discrimination.280 Similarly, the job security that the 
ADA is supposed to provide is of limited usefulness “in a world 
of reduced job security for everyone.”281 
C. PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS 
This Section first highlights several existing public-level 
programs that stress collaboration, information sharing, and 
flexibility. The Section then offers some critiques from new gov-
ernance theory. Finally this Section proposes and discusses two 
somewhat more ambitious alternatives, both offered with an 
eye toward increasing the range of actors involved in and effec-
tiveness of norm generation: (1) expanding administrative pro-
grams under the DOJ; and (2) applying doctrinal approaches 
from sexual harassment law to reasonable accommodation 
claims.  
There are already some facets of the disability law and pol-
icy system that stress collaboration, cooperative interactions, 
 
tion Statistics, FY 1997–FY 2006, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/litigation.html 
(last visited Nov. 5, 2007). This might not be quite as extreme as the case of 
OSHA regulation. See OSHA Reform: AFL-CIO Delegates Urge Congress to Act 
on Legislation to Amend Workplace Safety Law, 23 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 20, 
at 527 (Oct. 13, 1993) (statement of John Sweeney) (“[I]n the 23 years [since] 
the OSHA law was passed, only one employer has gone to jail for willfully vi-
olating OSHA law and killing a worker. In the last 10 years, seven people have 
gone to jail for harassing wild burros on federal land.”). It does show, however, 
that there is very little risk of an employer being sued for disability discrimi-
nation by the EEOC.  
 278. See Moxley, supra note 223, (criticizing a lawsuit for an improperly 
mounted bathroom mirror); see also Marjie Lundstrom & Sam Stanton, Visio-
nary Law’s Litigious Legacy, SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 12, 2006, at A1 (criticiz-
ing lawsuits for colors and wording of signs).  
 279. See Lobel, supra note 241, at 405 tbl.2 (characterizing the traditional 
regulatory model as “ossified,” with a “rigid and fixed” view of the nature of 
law). 
 280. Travis, supra note 15, at 5–6; see also Sturm, supra note 181, at 468–
74.  
 281. Samuel R. Bagenstos, US Airways v. Barnett and the Limit of Disabil-
ity Accommodation, in CIVIL RIGHTS STORIES (Myriam Gilles & Risa Goluboff 
eds., forthcoming 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=953759.  
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and information sharing. The various ADA regulations, for ex-
ample, were written with input from the disability law and 
business communities.282 This process ensures that an array of 
stakeholders have a voice, if not an ultimate say, in regulations 
that will impact them. Public agencies have also attempted to 
distill the law’s requirements into various user-friendly guides. 
The EEOC and DOJ all have helpful information on their web-
sites that provides visitors with nonbinding suggestions for how 
to comply with the ADA.283 The EEOC has also made an effort 
to increase its outreach and training activities.284  
The ADA also offers at least one concrete incentive for col-
laboration. The law provides that state and local governments 
can have their building codes certified by the DOJ as meeting 
or exceeding minimum accessibility guidelines.285 If they do, 
such governments receive a rebuttable presumption of com-
pliance in any ADA Title III litigation.286 This increases the op-
portunity for collaboration and effective ex ante compliance. 
There have also been some efforts for public enforcement offi-
cials to serve as a clearinghouse for information. The EEOC 
 
 282. See Equal Opportunity for Individuals with Disabilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 
35,726, 35,726 (July 26, 1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630) (noting that 
2400 disability rights representative participated in the rulemaking process, 
and that various employer groups, individuals, and disability rights repre-
sentatives submitted 138 comments to the EEOC); Press Release, United 
States Access Board, Access Board Issues New Guidelines for Accessible De-
sign (July 23, 2004), available at http://www.access-board.gov/news/ada-aba 
.htm (explaining that the participation of a “cross section of stakeholders, in-
cluding representatives from disability groups, the design profession, and 
building codes organizations” helped create a “historic level of harmonization” 
during the review of the ADA regulations). 
 283. ADA Home Page, http://www.ada.gov/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2007); 
EEOC, Disability Discrimination, http://www.eeoc.gov/types/ada.html (last vi-
sited Nov. 5, 2007). Among other subjects, the EEOC handbooks discuss how 
attorneys, small businesses, and food service companies may provide reasona-
ble accommodations for individuals with disabilities. See id. The DOJ’s hand-
books cover topics ranging from achieving van-accessible parking to providing 
disability accommodations in polling places. See ADA Home Page, supra.  
 284. See EEOC, Outreach, Education and Technical Assistance, http://www 
.eeoc/gov/outreach/index.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2007) (detailing the EEOC’s 
training and outreach efforts).  
 285. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2000). 
 286. See id. The DOJ reports that it has certified codes in Texas, Maine, 
Florida, Maryland, and North Carolina, and has requests pending from Cali-
fornia, Indiana, New Jersey, and Utah. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Additional In-
formation on the Certification Process, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/certinfo 
.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2007).  
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has stated a commitment to create stakeholder networks,287 in-
cluding advocacy groups and community organizations, al-
though it is unclear how extensive or effective these efforts 
have been. As part of his New Freedom initiative, President 
George W. Bush issued an executive order directing federal 
agencies to work with states to help them assess their com-
pliance with the ADA.288 The result was DisabilityInfo.gov, 
which bills itself as “the federal government’s one-stop Web site 
for people with disabilities, their families, employers, veterans 
and service members, and many others.”289 Through its Pro-
gram to Monitor ADA Litigation, the DOJ has recently made 
more of an effort to serve as a point of centralization for ADA 
litigation.290 
Perhaps the best example of a sustained and effective col-
laborative approach to ADA enforcement is the DOJ’s Project 
Civic Access program under Title II.291 Under this program, the 
DOJ identifies state and local governments and conducts com-
pliance reviews. The DOJ has developed technical assistance 
materials to help communities come into compliance with Title 
II, and ultimately enters into settlement agreements to ensure 
such compliance. As of September 2007, the DOJ has entered 
into 155 settlement agreements with 144 localities in all 50 
states.292 This program serves as a repository of information 
gathering, and has allowed the DOJ to build a body of expertise 
in identifying and offering solutions for common problems with 
Title II compliance. Also, by negotiating with individual state 
and local governments, the DOJ can impact more communities 
than it could by using more expensive and time-consuming liti-
gation. Further, the DOJ can tailor consent decrees that make 
sense for individual communities. Nevertheless, cities and 
towns are not lining up to participate; the state and local gov-
ernments that participate in Project Civic Access are chosen by 
 
 287. See EEOC, PRIORITY CHARGE HANDLING TASK FORCE app. c (1998), 
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/aoubeeoc/task_reports/pch-lit.html. 
 288. Exec. Order No. 13,217, 66 Fed. Reg. 33,155 (June 18, 2001). 
 289. Welcome to DisabilityInfo.gov, http://www.disability info.gov/ (last vi-
sited Nov. 5, 2007). 
 290. See United States Dep’t of Justice, Program to Monitor ADA Litiga-
tion, http://www.ada.gov/litmon.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2007).  
 291. See United States Dep’t of Justice, Project Civil Access Fact Sheet, 
http://www.ada.gov/civicfac.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2007). 
 292. Id.  
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the DOJ, and not the other way around.293 Moreover, the con-
sent decrees negotiated under Project Civic Access do not go 
beyond a bare minimum of statutory compliance.294 This is de-
spite the fact that the program defines the ADA’s goals more 
broadly than antidiscrimination, which seems to open the door 
for a broader dialogue.295  
Ultimately, these developments trend in the direction of 
new governance without taking large steps. Two more aggres-
sive approaches, both issue areas within the ADA, (1) offer lit-
tle in the way of precise statutory guidance except for high level 
guarantees of protection from discriminatory behavior; (2) 
could benefit from individualized and contextualized solutions 
that would be more accepted by stakeholders than those that 
courts have been able to provide; (3) like many other areas of 
the ADA, are currently underenforced; and (4) are places where 
public enforcement authorities are uniquely positioned to pro-
vide leadership on nontraditional enforcement options. 
The first alternative is Title II’s broad mandate that public 
entities not discriminate on the basis of disability in the pro-
grams, services, and activities that they offer.296 This rather 
sparse statutory provision offers a unique opportunity for new 
governance principles to work. The law sets broad aspirations 
at a fairly general level, but leaves room for norm elaboration 
and defining.297 Yet the current system of underenforcement 
 
 293. See id. (“In most of these matters, the compliance reviews were under-
taken on the Department’s own initiative under the authority of Title II and, 
in many cases, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 because the gov-
ernments receive financial assistance from the Department and are prohibited 
by the Act from discriminating on the basis of disability.”).  
 294. They may even stop short of that. See id. (“During the investigations, 
staff of the Disability Rights Section reviewed compliance with most ADA re-
quirements.” (emphasis added)).  
 295. See id. (“The key goals of the ADA are to ensure that all people with 
disabilities have equality of opportunity, economic self-sufficiency, full partici-
pation in American life, and independent living.”). 
 296. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000) (“Subject to the provisions of this sub-
chapter, no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disa-
bility, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the servic-
es, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination 
by any such entity.”).  
 297. The statute provides that the Attorney General will promulgate regu-
lations to “implement” Title II, see 42 U.S.C. § 12134(a) (2000), which the DOJ 
has done, see 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.101–35.190 (2007). These regulations, while 
somewhat more specific than the actual statute, still leave ample room for 
specific norm generation. See, e.g., id. § 35.130(b)(1) (“[Public entities shall 
not] deny a qualified individual with a disability the opportunity to participate 
in or benefit from the aid, benefit, or service.”).  
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leaves too many states and counties free to essentially opt out 
of any meaningful reform.298 Some steps are needed to jump 
start reform and ensure accountability.  
One option would be expanding the basic idea that is of-
fered in the DOJ’s Project Civic Access program. The DOJ could 
require public entities covered by Title II to submit self-
evaluations and plans, demonstrating what modifications to ac-
cessibility they have already made and what they are planning 
to make.299 Rather than focusing on selected cities, the DOJ 
would essentially require public entities to more formally en-
gage in the process. There is precedent for public enforcement 
authorities playing this type of screening and information-
gathering role. The EEOC, for example, collects disability-
related information from employers in its EEO-1 surveys.300 
And the structure of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act involved 
states having to “pre-clear” changes to their voting systems 
with the DOJ.301  
The challenge would be to find the proper balance between 
using these reports to create opportunities for similar entities 
to learn from each other’s decisions and progress, yet also still 
vesting ultimate coercive power with the DOJ if the plans re-
veal deficiencies. These plans need to be public, so as to create 
a centralized source of knowledge from which other public enti-
ties may learn. The value of this endeavor would be compro-
mised if the risk of litigation was so great as to discourage hon-
 
 298. See, e.g., Waterstone, supra note 61, at 1857–59 (describing how states 
exhibit “significant noncompliance” with Title II of the ADA). 
 299. This idea would be easy to implement. Since 2003, the DOJ’s Title II 
regulations have required that public entities must complete self-evaluations 
of their services, policies, and practices, and develop a transition plan to make 
any necessary modifications. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.105a. Yet the opportunity for 
this exercise to stimulate discussion, reform, and learning was largely lost. 
Though the fact that these plans had to be publicly available for three years 
after they were written, see id., there was no visible effort by the DOJ to use 
these plans as a basis for information sharing and dialogue, despite the De-
partment’s statutory mandate to “implement” Title II. See 42 U.S.C. § 12134 
(2000). 
 300. The EEOC has been criticized for not systematically analyzing or 
sharing that information. See supra note 185; see also Sturm, supra note 181, 
at 551. 
 301. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1970). True, this part of the Voting Rights Act 
has triggered contentious federalism objections. But what I am describing for 
ADA purposes is far less intrusive on state sovereignty; whereas section 5 of 
the Voting Rights Act requires states to actively petition the federal govern-
ment before they make changes (to avoid incurring legal liability), state and 
local governments merely have to report on what they have done and are 
planning to do. See id. 
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est reporting and good faith efforts at innovation. It would also 
be harmful if, based on empty promises of future reform, dere-
lict public entities were allowed complete amnesty when no 
progress was being made. In striking this balance, the guide-
posts should be process as well as outcome oriented. In prepar-
ing these plans, are public entities involved in meaningful dis-
cussions with different constituencies, including seeking the 
input of the disability community? Knowing that the ADA does 
not require absolute and perfect access to every facet of every 
governmental endeavor, have the parties made appropriate 
choices about priorities and direction? Do all parties seem satis-
fied (or equally unsatisfied) with the outcome and plan?  
This proposal attempts to shift the locus of control from 
courts deciding what is or is not “discrimination,” an undertak-
ing for which their capacity in the Title II context has been 
rightly criticized as inconsistent and insufficiently flexible.302 
Instead, the power is ideally put in the hands of stakeholders, 
allowing them the space to create solutions that are meaningful 
and acceptable to them. The DOJ—and the courts if neces-
sary—serve as facilitators in this process and enforcers if need 
be. However, like others who express trepidation at the “soft-
ness” in new governance,303 one would be loathe to abandon the 
ultimate coercive authority of either the private or public at-
torney general. Without it, flexible enforcement options start to 
look more like opt out provisions.304 
The second area where new governance theory could have 
a helpful impact on creating change involves reasonable ac-
commodation claims. Here, the law provides a somewhat more 
 
 302. Compare Am. Ass’n of People with Disabilities v. Hood, 310 F. Supp. 
2d 1226, 1236 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (holding that Florida Supervisor of Elections 
violated the regulations promulgated under the ADA by purchasing a voting 
system that was not readily accessible to people with disabilities without 
third-party assistance), with Am. Ass’n of People with Disabilities v. Shelley, 
324 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1126 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (“Nothing in the Americans with 
Disabilities Act or its Regulations reflects an intention on the part of Congress 
to require secret, independent voting.”).  
 303. See supra note 261 and accompanying text. 
 304. Within campaign finance law, for example, commentators have ac-
knowledged some successes of the Federal Election Commission’s attempts to 
use new enforcement techniques, including conciliation, while noting that the 
Commission has maintained the ability to litigate if need be. See Bradley A. 
Smith & Stephen M. Hoersting, A Toothless Anaconda: Innovation, Impotence, 
and Overenforcement at the Federal Election Commission, 1 ELECTION L.J. 
145, 146–51 (2002); see also Todd Lochner, Overdeterrence, Underdeterrence, 
and a (Half-Hearted) Call for a Scarlet Letter Approach to Campaign Finance 
Violations, 2 ELECTION L.J. 23, 25–32 (2003). 
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definitive backdrop. The ADA explicitly confers a positive right 
on individuals with disabilities to a reasonable accommodation 
to allow them to perform their jobs.305 But the ADA is silent on 
what separates a reasonable accommodation from an unrea-
sonable one.306 The doctrinal result is a rather inconsistent set 
of cases where judges attempt to delineate an imprecise line,307 
despite having a limited set of statutory and policy tools for 
doing so.308 This uncertainty is further exacerbated by the fact 
that most ADA cases do not even make it to the point where a 
judge or jury will make a pronouncement as to a requested ac-
commodation’s reasonableness; rather, most cases are dis-
missed at the earlier summary judgment phase, often because a 
plaintiff cannot meet the statute’s definition of disability.309  
This state of affairs provides insufficient guidance or norm 
elaboration for the vast majority of accommodation request sit-
uations that never get anywhere near the courthouse.310 This is 
an unsatisfying outcome, and one that fails to sufficiently tap 
into the law’s transformative potential. How can the positive, 
 
 305. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(a) (2000) (defining discrimination as the 
failure to make “reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental 
imitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability”).  
 306. See id. Congress specifically considered—and rejected—a more precise 
formula. See Burgdorf, supra note 85, at 518. Although this has been criticized 
as a weakness of the statute, see Steven B. Epstein, In Search of a Bright Line: 
Determining When an Employer’s Financial Hardship Becomes “Undue” Under 
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 48 VAND. L. REV. 390, 397 (1995), it allows 
for this type of norm-shifting from courts to a range of stakeholders.  
 307. Compare Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, 487 F.3d 480, 484 (8th Cir. 2007) 
(holding that an employee with a disability must be reassigned to a vacant po-
sition as an accommodation only if the employee is the most qualified appli-
cant for that position), with Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1167 
(10th Cir. 1999) (holding that reassignment under the ADA results in auto-
matically awarding a position to a qualified disabled employee regardless of 
whether other, better-qualified applicants are available).  
 308. See Jeffrey O. Cooper, Interpreting the Americans with Disabilities 
Act: The Trials of Textualism and the Practical Limits of Practical Reason, 74 
TUL. L. REV. 1207, 1217–24 (2000) (describing the limits of statutory interpre-
tation in ADA cases).  
 309. Amy L. Allbright, 2005 Employment Decisions Under the ADA Title 
I—Survey Update, 30 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 492, 492 (show-
ing that in 2005, in 288 out of 401 Title I cases, employers won on motions for 
summary judgment or to dismiss due to plaintiff employee’s failure to meet 
the requirements of a prima facie case of discrimination). 
 310. See Laura Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson, Rights Realized? An Em-
pirical Analysis of Employment Discrimination Litigation as a Claiming Sys-
tem, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 663, 664–65 (arguing that antidiscrimination law is 
“seldom used by people who perceive themselves to be the target of workplace 
discrimination”).  
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though imprecise guarantees in the ADA be more effectively 
utilized?  
Under contemporary notions of class action litigation, rea-
sonable accommodation cases are often viewed as so individua-
lized that litigating them on a systemic basis has not proven ef-
fective.311 One answer, then, may lie in borrowing from 
doctrinal moves urged in sexual harassment law, and increa-
singly focusing on process in the reasonable accommodation 
context.312 Liability could be imposed on employers who do not 
have a fair and legitimate process for assessing the reasonable-
ness of any requested accommodation. There is regulatory and 
case law support for such an approach. The EEOC’s regulations 
already come down strongly on the side of making the reasona-
ble accommodation request an “interactive process,”313 and at 
least one circuit court has held that an employer who does not 
engage in the interactive process may be precluded from ob-
taining summary judgment on an ADA failure-to-accommodate 
claim.314 If a court was called to do so, it could ultimately pass 
judgment on the reasonableness of a requested accommodation, 
but placing a doctrinal premium on the process could force em-
ployers to more seriously respond to requests for accommoda-
tion. 
A more administrative-type proposal would involve em-
ployers submitting reports to the EEOC detailing their reason-
able accommodation practices, including past responses to re-
 
 311. See Stein & Waterstone, supra note 15, at 879–85 (explaining that 
under group-based discrimination theories, disability-based employment suits 
have proceeded on a largely individualized basis). 
 312. An employer may raise an internal antiharassment policy as a defense 
to a sexual harassment claim. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 
742, 765 (1998). Some circuits have expressed this as a presumption that an 
employer has exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct sexual harass-
ment. See, e.g., Matvia v. Bald Head Island Mgmt., Inc., 259 F.3d 261, 268 (4th 
Cir. 2001). Finally, demonstration of good faith efforts to comply with Title VII 
is a defense to punitive damages. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 
545 (1999).  
 313. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (2007) (explaining that the interactive process 
should “identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and po-
tential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations”).  
 314. See, e.g., Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1116 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(en banc), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub. nom. U.S. Airways, 
Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002). Justice Stevens specifically noted that the 
Ninth Circuit “correctly held that there was a triable issue of fact precluding 
the entry of summary judgment with respect to whether [an employer violates 
the ADA] by failing to engage in an interactive process.” Barnett, 535 U.S. at 
407 (2002) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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quests for accommodation and procedures for handling such re-
quests. The template for this already exists; it would essential-
ly be a more detailed version of the EEO-1 form that large em-
ployers are already required to file with the EEOC.315 Like the 
Title II discussion above, there will be an issue regarding the 
level of coerciveness of these reports. Should they be voluntary, 
with perks (like a rebuttable presumption in the employer’s fa-
vor in litigation) offered to employers that demonstrate innova-
tive internal processes for dealing with disability at the hiring 
and reasonable accommodation stages (ideally arrived at with 
consultations with specialists like the Job Accommodation 
Network and/or disability community),316 or have a demon-
strated and constituent record of hiring employees with disabil-
ities? Or should they be mandatory, with penalties or risk of lit-
igation for deficient practices? 
In any event, the focus of both the doctrinal and adminis-
trative approaches attempts to use the shadow of litigation to 
influence behavior outside of court in a way that stresses prob-
lem solving and bringing various stakeholders to the table. The 
goal is to move reasonable accommodation cases away from 
courts, where they tend to become zero-sum gain contests be-
tween adversaries, toward networks of employers, employees, 
and specialists who have the incentives to arrive at mutually 
agreeable ex ante solutions. In so doing, the hope would be that 
the conversation could be transformed from litigating highly 
individualized contentious cases toward efforts to create more 
disability-friendly workplaces.317  
 
 315. See supra notes 185 & 300 and accompanying text. 
 316. The Job Accommodation Network is a free consulting service designed 
to “increase the employability of people with disabilities by: 1) providing indi-
vidualized worksite accommodations solutions, 2) providing technical assis-
tance regarding the ADA and other disability related legislation, and 3) edu-
cating callers about self-employment options.” Job Accommodation Network, 
http://www.jan.wvu.edu (last visited Nov. 5, 2007). 
 317. Because the number of actual employees who will even file a claim 
with the EEOC, let alone bring a lawsuit, is so miniscule, the hope is that this 
self evaluation will benefit far more employees than could ever be impacted 
except through the mechanism of class and systemic litigation. See Nielsen & 
Nelson, supra note 310, at 664–65. For alternative solutions, see Green, supra 
note 195, at 679 (suggesting that individual claim for harassment could trigger 
“diagnostic investigation into the possibility that a broader discriminatory 
work culture” may exist); and Stein & Waterstone, supra note 15 (offering a 
litigation-based system for transforming individualized claims for accommoda-
tion into larger workplace reevaluations). 
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  CONCLUSION   
It is my hope that this Article will expand the dialogue on 
the enforcement of civil rights and antidiscrimination laws. 
Rights without remedies benefit no one, and laws that are sys-
tematically underenforced create a “hollow hope” that can im-
pede other forms of social change. The existing discussion has 
focused on the limits of the private attorney general to enforce 
civil rights laws. The importance of private enforcement cannot 
be disputed, and it is imperative that judicial opinions limiting 
the ability of the private civil rights bar to sue acting in the 
public interest are reversed. But until that happens, and even 
thereafter, public enforcement should not be let off the hook so 
easily. In the past, public enforcement played a more important 
role in the enforcement of civil rights; and it is my hope that 
this can happen in the future.  
To that end, I have focused on what a more effective public 
enforcement scheme should look like. Within the context of the 
ADA, this will vary across contexts. The first and most impor-
tant piece is a public commitment to systemic litigation. The 
criteria for identifying areas where this should occur are where 
the profit motive for plaintiffs and private attorneys is low, 
noncompliance appears to be systemic, there is an absence of 
case development, and individual plaintiffs will have standing 
difficulties in challenging various forms of discrimination. 
Within disability law, I have presented two categories of cas-
es—failure-to-hire and physical access cases—that fit this de-
scription. Outside of disability law, there are certainly others. 
New governance also provides a theoretical foundation for 
evaluating other types of enforcement activity. Enforcement op-
tions that stress creative individualized solutions, collaborative 
problem solving with a diverse range of stakeholders, and effec-
tive information strategies deserve support. There are areas 
within the ADA that would benefit from more diverse yet loca-
lized norm elaboration. Ultimately, however, these more flexi-
ble alternatives need to be coupled with a consistent and clear 
commitment to systemic public litigation. The two parts of this 
paper should be understood as functioning together to improve 
public enforcement. In this way, the ADA can take its place 
amongst other civil rights statutes as having created opportu-
nity and access for a previously excluded group.  
